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SOME MISCELLANEOUS NOVELTIES IN THE NEW
CORPORATION STATUTES
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INTRODUCTION
The recent wave of revisions of the general business corporation statutes of many
jurisdictions has typically introduced many changes that, while novel, perhaps, in
their own particular contexts, are not at all revolutionary in American legislative
history. Although examples abound, an apposite illustration are the newly-popular
provisions relating to the maintenance and inspection of records:" there is practically
nothing here that cannot be found somewhere in the corporate legislation enacted
in this country during the first third of the present century. This is not to say, of
course, that the current statutory revisions have produced no innovations-for,
indeed, they have. Most of the more significant of these have, in fact, been
explored in some detail elsewhere in this symposium. Accordingly, it is to a collec-
tion and discussion-although by no means an exhaustive one2 -of some odds and
ends that remain that this article is devoted.
By "new" corporation statutes, reference is made to those enacted in the 194o's
and i95o's. This may, perhaps, be a rather arbitrary criterion, but it would seem, at
least partially, to be indicated by the post-World-War-II ferment in the area of
corporate legislation; moreover, it fits the midcentury outlook of this symposium.
It need hardly be noted, however, that the extensive revisions of corporation statutes
in the early i 93 o's-to which may be added, for good measure, the Ohio and Dela-
ware revisions of the late 192o's-also introduced many new features; and the
famous New Jersey corporation statute of 1896, which to a legal historian at least
is recent legislation and which, it may be hazarded, is the fountainhead of modern
American corporation law, was daringly unique in a number of respects.
I
ORGANIZATION AND RELATED EARLY-STAGE MArtis
I. Corporate name
Perhaps the most significant novelty in organizational stage is the right given by
the new statutes of Oregon, Texas, and Virginia, following the Model Business
*B.S. 1923, Bowdoin College; J.D. 1930, University of Michigan; J.Sc.D. 1936, Columbia Univer-
sity. Member of the New York bar; Dean and Professor of Law, Duke University. Author, SUBsmiAMES
AND AFFILIATEi> CORPoRATIoNs (1936), INTRODUCTION TO BusiNEss ASSOCIATIONS (1951). Contributor to
legal periodicals.
"E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38 (Supp. 1955); N.D. Laws 1957, c. 102, S 47; ORE. REv. STAT.
§ 57.246 (Supp. 1955); and TEx. Bus. Corp. Acr art. 2.44 (x956).
'A significant, but unsuspected, innovation may sometimes be effected, intentionally or otherwise,
by an apparently innocent and minor change in a statutory text that is superficially quite orthodox. An
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Corporation Act, to a foreign corporation not doing business in the state to "register"
its name and to renew this registration from year to year 3 This enables the "fencing
in" of a name, if it is still open, which makes it unavailable even to local enterprises,
in the event that the registrant should, in the future, expand its activities into the
state and wish to use the name. This feature was not adopted in the District of
Columbia, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Wisconsin, however, even though
recent statutory revisions in those jurisdictions otherwise closely followed the Model
Act's provisions relating to corporate names. Of course, even in jurisdictions not
following the Model Act in this respect, a foreign corporation can still "fence in" its
name, if it is still open, by forming and maintaining therein a subsidiary corporation;
but this procedure is more expensive and cumbersome. The ultimate issue, then, is
whether "fencing in" should be made cheaper and easier.
A 1957 Pennsylvania enactment authorizes the use of an injunction to prevent
a corporation from using a name which it has agreed to give up, or a name decep-
tively similar, under a written consent duly executed and filed.
A few recent statutes also make it clear that the choice of an official corporate
name does not prevent the adoption of an assumed name as well.* Thus, for
example, a corporation with the legal name of Smith Motor Repairs Co, Inc., might
quite properly wish and be permitted to do business under the name of West Side
Garage.
2. Single incorporator
Wisconsin's 1951 statutory revision admits of a single incorporator, instead of
requiring the customary three or more.6 This is not an entirely new idea,7 but it is
so rare as to merit notice. A more general adoption of this provision, however, can
perhaps be anticipated in view of the apprehension aroused in one state recently by a
decision that questioned the validity of a one-man corporation under the usual
statutory provision requiring three or more incorporators8
3. Simplified incorporation procedure-single registry and little else
The Model Act would streamline the incorporation procedure by having only a
single central filing in the office of the secretary of state, dispensing with such
additional rituals, found until recently nearly everywhere, as recording in the
example of this might be those recent dividend statutes that, at first glance, seem to afford adequate pro-
tection by the "stated capital" cushion, but which, on closer examination, apparently remove all restric-
tions on the payment of dividends. See infra 374-76.
3 ORE. Rv. STAT. § 57-055, 57.060 (Supp. 1955); TEx. Bus. CoRP. AcT art. 2.07, 2.08 (1956); VA.
ConE ANN. § 13.x-8 (Supp. 1956); Cf. MODEL BUSINESS CoRPoRA77om ACr § 8.
'PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2852-202, 2852-a002 (Supp. 1957).
'ORE. REv. STAT. § 57.045 (Supp. X955); Tax. Bus. CoRP. ACe art. 2.05 (1956).8
WIS. STAT. § 180.44 (1955)-
'
T his unusual feature has long existed in Iowa, see IowA CoDE §§ 673 et seq., 702 (i850), and
persists today. IOWA CODE § 491.2 (954). The other state with this feature permits the single
incorporator to be itself a corporation. MicH. Comsp. LAws §§ 450.2, 450.3 (1948).
'Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 241 N.C. 473, 85 S.E.ad 677 (1955),on rehearing, 243
N.C. 595, 91 S.E.2d 584 (1956).
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central office, filing or recording in a local county seat, submission of papers to other
officials for approval, publication in newspapers, opening of books for subscriptions,
affidavits of payment of specified percentages of capital stock, and othersO Texas,
North Dakota, and Oregon have recently followed the Model Act's streamlining,
even as to the single, central filing'°-Oregon, only after a change of heart in
1955.11 Other states that have come under the general influence of the Model Act,
however, such as North Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin, still require local record-
ing, presumably reflecting the sentiment of the bar. 2 But it is doubtful whether
the infrequent need for a quick inexpensive look at local records, as against getting
information from the central office, warrants the additional burden of local recording
or even of local duplicate filing.
4. Pre-incorporation subscriptions and promotional activities
Although legislation designed to afford a mechanism for creating irrevocable
pre-incorporation subscriptions to stock, so as to avoid the pitfalls that legal theory
had created for business-like firm commitments, is not novel,'" the near unanimity
with which corporate law revisions since World War II have adopted the idea is
worthy of that designation. 4
A 1951 Oklahoma statutory amendment makes a pre-incorporation subscription
revocable if the articles of incorporation are amended by the incorporators without
consent of the subscribers. 5 Apparently the privilege to revoke is absolute, regard-
less of the seriousness of the amendment, although perhaps a court may take it
upon itself to draw distinctions between material and immaterial amendments.6
Several novelties relating to subscriptions are also observable in the North Caro-
lina statutory revision of 1955. This legislation does not recognize as a defense to the
enforcement of pre-incorporation subscriptions the failure to notify the subscribers of
0 MODEL BusiNEss CoRPoRATIoN AT § 49. Florida, however, perhaps in response to the spirit of the
land boom of the 192o's and in reaction to its previous cumbersome requirements, has had a simple,
central-filing procedure since 1925. For the rituals previously required in Florida, see FLA. Rav. GEN.
STAT. H9 4051, 4052, 4054 (1920).
'
0
Tx. Bus. CoRP. ACT art. 3.03 (1956); N.D. Laws 1957, c. 102, § 50; ORE. REV. STAT. 5 57-316
(SupL. 1955).
"'Cf. ORE. Rav. § 57-36, as enacted in Ore. Laws 1953, c. 549, § 49.12N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-4, 55-8 (Supp. 1955); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-51 (Supp. 1956); Wis. STAT.
1 80-48 (r955)_
"
5Mor. BusiNEss CORPORATION Aar or 1928, § 6, 9 U.L.A. 132 (1957), provided for irrevocable
subscriptions. Legislation pattern thereon stiU embodies the idea. See LA. REV. STAT. § 12:6 (1950);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-109 (1948); WAsH. REv. CODE § 23.08.020 (Supp. 1952).
"But irrevocability in the Oklahoma statutory revision of 1947 exists only by implication. See
OxLA. STAT. tit. I, § 1.31 (1951). Moreover, the Florida statutory revision of 1953 is silent on this
topic, as is that of Virginia of 1956. This last, however, has been explained on the ground that under
existing judicial decisions, particularly Marcuse v. Broad Grace Arcade Corp., 164 Va. 553, 18o S.E. 327
(1935), subscriptions are revocable only upon unanimous consent of the shareholders and subscribers.
See Gibson, The Virginia Corporation Law of 1956, 42 VA. L. REv. 445, 459 (956). But one must
view the Virginia law as not completely settled, since the Marcuse case involved an attempted cancella-
tion of a subscription duly accepted by the newly-organized corporation and not a pre-incorporation with-
drawal by a subscriber.
5 Os.A. STAT. tit. r8, § 1.31(b) and (d) (1951).
" Cf. 4 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 1433, 1765 (931).
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their right to participate in selecting the first board of directors or in otherwise
perfecting the organization.'1 It was apparently believed that this defense is used
primarily as a convenient excuse to renege on a subscription and that, in real cases
of "failure of consideration," where the excluded subscribers had been misled to
believe that they would participate in perfecting the organization, a court could still
find the exclusion to be a defense. That same legislation also undertakes to regulate
in the matter of certain "come on" clauses or representations in connection with
subscriptions-e.g., payment to be made out of earnings, subscriber to have "put"
option, etc. These features give rise to no defense against the corporation in the
enforcement of the subscription, but only to actions against the guilty participants,
Since, however, this provision was apparently inserted for the benefit of innocent
interests in the corporation, the absence of such interests might bring about a different
result. In addition, this legislation provides a rather unusual alternative remedy
against the subscriber who is in default on payments: the corporation is given the
choice of rescinding and keeping as liquidated damages up to ten per cent of the
subscription price.' 9 Finally, the troublesome common-law distinction between
"subscription" and "contract to purchase"' is sought to be minimized in this legisla-
tion by giving the corporation in any event, upon default the rights of enforcement
that are normally characteristic of "subscription."'"
Promotional activities call to mind the embattled field of promoters' liability
for secret profits and overvaluation of property or services received as payment for
stock and the related struggles over watered-stock liability. Fortunately, the awk-
wardness of state law, largely uncodified, which has, perhaps, served only to educate
counselors of well-advised promoters as to the finer points of liability avoidance, is
less crucial since the Federal Securities Act of 1933.22 In any event, a novel excep-
tion to the general legislative disposition to leave these matters to the somewhat
chaotic common law, with its dubious distinctions and refinements, rendered even
more confusing by the advent of the no par value share, is the recent North Carolina
statute's endeavor to combine the principles of promoters' liability with those of
stock-watering liability, through a new statutorily-defined concept of "watered
shares."23 The statute adopts the basic idea that when the recipient of shares gets
more than that to which he was entitled, in light of both his contribution to the
corporation and his relationship to the venture and to those in control, he must either
Inake an additional contribution or surrender some of his shares, whichever be the
more appropriate remedy. This approach purports to clarify a number of trouble-
some points: liability does not turn on whether the diluted outside shareholders
1 7 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-43 (f) (Supp. 1955). Cf. Windsor Hotel v. Schenk, 76 W.Va. 1, 84 S.E.
911 (1915) (absent statute in point).
'
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-43(e) (Supp. 1955).
"gId. § 55-43(i).
2 Cf. Stern v. Mayer, 166 Minn. 346, 207 N.W. 737 (1926); Annot. 46 A.L.R. 5172 (1926).
2'N.C. GEN. STAr. § 55-43(a) and (h) (Supp. 1955).
22 48 STAT. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1952).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-53 (Supp. 1955).
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bought their shares directly from the corporation or from the stage-planning pro-
moters nor on whether they were already shareholders when the promoters got their
shares or came in later as per the promoters' plan; and liability cannot be evaded
by the no par value stock device nor, in all probability, by the issuance of preferred
shares to outsiders and watered common shares to the promoters.
5. Corporate purposes
A novel and heartening note of realism is found in the Wisconsin statute, which,
after setting forth the usual requirement that the charter is to state the purpose for
which the corporation is organized, goes on to provide:24
It shall be sufficient compliance with this paragraph to state, either alone or with
other purposes, that the corporation may engage in any lawful activity within the purposes
for which corporations may be organized under this chapter, and all such lawful
activities shall by such statement be deemed within the purposes of the corporation,
subject to expressed limitations, if any.
Complementing this is a provision, itself not entirely novel, that "it shall not be
necessary to set forth in the articles of incorporation any of the corporate powers
enumerated in this chapter,"2 5 which, in turn, is supported by a very broad corporate
powers section enumerating an exhaustive list of corporate powers 6 Here is a
realistic recognition of the fact that today we are ready for a short-charter "all-
purpose" corporation-one in which the stockholder has no right to expect manage-
ment to adhere to enumerated channels of economic activity, but, rather, may well
expect management to pursue any line of activity that bids fair to earn an honest
dollar. The ancient tradition of the corporate charter as a "grant," to be narrowly
construed, with its concomitant doctrine of ultra vires, has merely resulted in gobble-
degook27 drafting of omnibus charters, with fantastic enumeration of purposes and
powers, plus tongue-in-cheek clauses that all the powers are also meant to be pur-
2"NVIS. STAT. § 180.45(I)(c) (1955)" "Id. § 180-45(2).
2'1d. § 180.04.
VELviN R. LATTY, INTRODUCTION TO BUSINEss AssociATIoNs Ii (ig5x): "Thus . . . you will not
find the lawyer drafting 'to own and operate a drugstore' but more likely something like this gobblede-
gook in the drafting of which the writer once participated:
"'To manufacture, import, export, buy, sell, use, distribute, transport, store and otherwise deal in
and use drugs, drug sundries, medicines, patent medicines, prescriptions, medical formulae, proprietary
articles, chemicals, extracts, tinctures, pomades, ointments, liniments, physicians' and hospital supplies and
equipment, surgical instruments and equipment, scientific apparatus, dental goods, rubber goods, toilet
articles and preparations, perfumes, cosmetics, paints, chemicals, oils, dye stuffs, brushes, electric goods
and supplies, music, musical supplies, cameras, photographers' equipment and supplies, optical supplies,
stationery, postcards, books, newspapers, magazines, periodicals, cigars, cigarettes, tobacco, smokers'
supplies, candy, confectionery, soda, carbonated and aerated waters, ice cream, soft drinks refreshments,
pastry, foods and food products, jewelry, hardware, leather goods, clocks, watches, cutlery, art goods,
dry goods, notions, novelties, small wares, and all articles and other merchandise of every kind, nature
and description, and all cartons, containers, kegs, barrels, jars, bottles, boxes, tins, packages and other
materials or substances used in the packing, wrapping, boxing, preserving or marketing thereof; to operate,
maintain or conduct warehouses and retail or wholesale stores, shops and stands in the United States
or elsewhere for the purpose of storing, selling or otherwise dealing in any of the articles and other
merchandise hereinbefore mentioned.'
"A paragraph like the foregoing is frequently just the beginning of the purpose and objects clause."
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poses, plus clauses to counteract interpretations of eiusdem generis and exclusio
alterius. All this boiler plate is meant, or hoped, virtually to create an all-purpose
corpoartion. The time, therefore, has come to acknowledge this and, at least when
the parties so desire, permit the creation of an all-purpose corporation, with a short
charter enumerating not what the corporation is to do, but what, if anything, it
is not to do.28
Presumably, then, the charter of a Wisconsin corporation can now simply state:
"The purpose of the corporation is to engage in any'lawful activity within the pur-
pose for which corporations may be organized under the Business Corporation Law."
True, one will not know what a corporation's activities are by looking at its charter;
but realistically; even today, if one wants to know what kind of business activities the
corpbration is pursuing, he must look beyond the charter. And there is nothing in
the authorization of an all-purpose corporation which prevents or even rendeis
more difficult the appropriate solution of the problem of the rights and remedies of
investors who, by misrepresentation, are induced to invest their money for one
business purpose and find it applied quite differently.
A recent California enactment gives a novel twist to the idea of the informative
charter by requir'ihIg th6 charter to state the corporate purposes, "including a state-
ment in a separate paragraph identifying the specific business in which the corpora-
tion proioge primarily initially to engage."29 There seems, then, still to be some
life in the'quaint notion Of an informative charter, even though it discloses to the
*early reader of'the charter only what the corporation is going to start out to do, and,
to the later reader, only what it originally started out to do.
Novel, in the Sense that it sounds a new note in modern legislative drafting,
although state corporation statutes and even state constitutions at the turn of the
centuiry revealed a similar spirit, is the Texas resort to the "purpose" provisions of
the business corporation statute to strike at one aspect of business activity that is
usually thought of as being in the antitrust area-i.e., forbidding a corporation in one
line of activity to engage in a specific allied line that would result in a stifling com-
bination. The new Texas statute forbids a corporation to combine stock-raising
with slaughtering or subsequent processing, or oil-producing with oil pipe-lining80
II
CoRPORATE PowEs AND RELATED MArtEs
r. New enumerated powers
Recent legislation shows a decided trend away from that distrust of corporate
enterprise which manifested itself in extremely strict views of ultra vires and in
28 Contrast the philosophy of the new Texas statute requiring that "the purposes shall be fully stated
in the articles of incorporation." TFx. Bus. Coap. Aar art. 2.ox-A (z956). With this encouragement,
the Texas lawyer should scale new heights of exuberant drafting. But Texas has long had a std generis
attitude toward corporate powers and purposes. See the now-displaccd Texas Corporation Law. Tax.
Rav. Civ. STAT. art. 1302 (1948).
"s CAL. CoRP. CODE § 301(b).
"T~. Bus. Come. Aar art. 2.oi-B( 3 ) (1956). The qualifications in the prohibition indicate, how-
ever, that the welfare of local oil interests were not overlooked.
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doctrines that always created a doubt when a corporation contemplated the employ-
ment of new techniques in keeping with the advancing science (or is it an art?) of
management. The result has been a constant lengthening of the list of enumerated
powers granted to corporations in state statutes.
2. Donations
Although expresss authorizations of donations for charitable, religious, scientific,
educational, or other beneficient purposes have occasionally appeared in corpora-
tion statutes for a long time,'1 it is worthy of note that every jurisdiction that has
substantially revised its corporation statutes since World War. I2 has inserted a
provision of this sort. All of them except Kentucky3 3 expressly authorize "charitable"
donations, and all but the District of Columbia specifically sanction "education" as
an appropriate object of corporate largesse; 34 a majority, however, shy away from
likewise voicing approbation of religious donations0 5 Similar donative authorization
has also been reflected in the statutes of a number of states which have not, in
generals substantially revised their corporation staitutes3 6 Most of these statutory
provisions, however, seem to leave an opening for a conservative court still to require
a fairly direct benefit to the corporation;"' one cannot count always on the liberality
and breadth of vision revealed in A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow.8
'3. Wartime powers
A noteworthy sidelight on our troublesome times is cast by the adoption in several
jurisdictions of the Model Act provision conferring power on a corporation, what-
ever be its business, to transact any lawful business in time of war and in aid of
the United States in prosecution of the war.3 9 Until recent times, such a provision,
although not unknown,40 was very rare.
4. Fringe benefits
The new statutory revisions have also evinced an inclination expressly to authorize,
"1 See Bell, Corporation Support of Education: Legal Basis, 38 A.B.A.J. x19 (x952), for a list of
jurisdictions.
" California, District of Columbia, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina, Ohio, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
"
1 Ky. REv. STAT. § 271X25 (i955).
"i.C. CODE ANNe. § 29-904 (Supp. 1956).
"
1 E.g. California, District of Columbia, Florida, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Texas.
MODEL BusINEss CORPORAMToN Aar § 4(m), however, authorizes religious donations.
"' See de Capriles & Garrett, Legality of Corporate Support to Education: A Survey of Current De-
velopments, 38 A.B.A.J. 209 (952). Not to be overlooked is the authors' point that there may be a
constitutional problem with respect to corporations formed before the statute was amended to permit
the donation in question. The authors' view that the problem is not serious, however, is sound.
1 See, however, the Oklahoma statute which authorizes donations that will "benefit or contribute to
the corporate or public interest." OsA. STAT. tit. i8, § 9 (i95i). (Emphasis added.)
13 N.j. 145, 98 A.2d 58I (1953).
Z MoDEL BusiN.ss CoR,.o.ATnoN Aar § 4(n), followed by D.C. CoDn ANNt. § 29-904 (Supp. 1955);
N.D. Laws 1957, c. 102, § 4-13; ORE. Rav. STAT. § 57.030(04) (Supp. 1955); TEx. Bus. CoRP,. ACr, art.
2.o2(I5) (1956); WsS. STAT. § 1So.04(13) (1955).
"Apparently the idea grew out of World War I experience, as shown by a similar provision in the
Illinois General Corporation Act of 1919, Ill. Laws i919, at 318.
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probably out of excess of caution,4 ' the power to pay pensions and to establish plans
for pensions, profit-sharing, stock bonuses, and other incentives for directors, officers,
and employees-particularly in those jurisdictions that have closely followed the 1953
draft of the Model Act4 Again, there is no complete novelty here: a Pennsylvania
statutory provision authorizing corporate pensions43 dates apparently from 1893, at
least in so far as it relates to "employees"; and the New Jersey statutory provision
authorizing employee stock-acquisition plans and profit-sharing," dating from 192o,
is called to mind by the famous American Tobacco Co. litigation.
5. Partnership arrangements
The new North Carolina statute permits corporations virtually to enter into
partnership arrangements, even if that involves sharing control with others or dele-
gating control to others.46 The novelty of this provision lies largely in its specific
attention to the troublesome corporate-partnership problem. Possibly the provision
long existing in some state statutes which has permitted a corporation to acquire
shares and "interests in" partnerships and other forms of enterprise could be stretched
to reach the same end4
6. Guaranties
The power conferred by one recent statutory revision in somewhat unusual
phraseology, "to enter into contracts of guaranty or suretyship or make other financial
arrangement for the benefit of its personnel or customers or suppliers,"48 apparently
is based on the fear that, in the light of the decisions of that state at least, mere
general guaranty-authorizing language is not satisfactory49
III
Somr MINUTIAE ABOUT DIRECTORS AND MANAGEMENT' 0
i. Service on nonresident directors
Beginning with Indiana in I945, 5 -several jurisdictions have subjected nonresident
directors of domestic corporations to the process of local courts in suits by or against
41 See Bleickcn, Corporate Contributions to Charities: The Modern Rule, 38 A.B.A.J. 999, ool
(1952).
42ND. Laws 1957, c. 102, § 4-16; ORE. REv. STrAT. § 57.030(16) (Supp. 1955); Tax. Bus. CoaR.
AcT art. 2.02(17) (1956); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-3(0) (Supp. 1956); c. MODEL BusiNEss CoRPoRAToN
AC- § 4(p).
"'PA. STAT. tit. 15, § 2852-316 (1936).
"N.J. REv. STAT. § 14:9-1 (1937).
"'Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-17 (Supp. 1955).
""See CHicAGo BAR ASS'N, ILLINois BusINESS CORPORATION AcT ANNOTATED 36 (2d ed. 1947), com-
menting on section 5(g) of that Act, which goes back to the 1933 revision.
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-17(b)( 3 ) (Supp. 1955).
"Very few corporation statutes specifically mention the power to guarantee, and the few that do
seem to be aimed at guaranteeing securities of other corporations and enterprises. Fortunately, in many
jurisdictions, a sound body of common law is fully adequate to business needs.
'°The major trends and developments relating to directors and management are to be found in
other articles in this symposium.
"
1
IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-8o4b (1946).
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the corporation to which the director is a "proper" or "necessary" party52 or "relating
to'')53or "arising out of or founded upon" the action of a domestic corporation, with
provision for substituted service upon the secretary of state or the corporation's
service-of-process agentYr  Such statutory provisions insure that at least one juris-
diction can entertain a derivative suit against directors in that awkward situation
where the corporation, although a necessary party defendant, cannot be "found" in,
the same jurisdiction where the real defendants are.5" A statutory provision of this
kind, which has been held not to violate due process, 6 would also be helpful in meet-
ing the difficulty presented by those decisions holding that in a suit to compel pay-
ment of dividends, the directors are necessary parties.57 On compelling dividends,
incidentally, the new North Carolina statute doubly clinches the matter by permitting
a suit for that purpose to be brought against the corporation, with or without joining
the directorsYF A somewhat similar problem arose a few years ago when a suit to-
compel a corporation to cancel options allegedly given without consideration was.
dismissed because of failure to join the optionees, who were held to be necessary
parties defendants; 9 but a recent statutory provision in one state at least would
handle the problem by making the suit quasi in rem, with the "situs" of the optiom
at the corporation's registered office, with the alternative of joining the optionees in.
an action in personam6 °
2. Directors-by-proxy
A 1955 Arkansas enactmentl permitting a director, if the bylaws so authorize,.
to vote by proxy, with the limitation that no director can be proxy-holder for more
than one other director, is unique enough to warrant notice, although the idea is.
"
2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-33 (Supp. 1955).
" S.C. CODE § 10-432.1 (1952).
" MIcH. CoMPs. LAWS § 450.70, (Supp. 1956).
" A partial solution of the difficulty can sometimes be achieved in federal courts through a combina-
tion of diversity citizenship, the venue statute which permits a derivative suit to be brought in any judiciar
district where the corporations could have sued the directors, 62 STAT. 936 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 140X
(x952), and the extraterritorial-service-of-process statute permitting process to be served on the corpora--
tion in any district where it is organized or licensed to do business or is doing business. 62 STAT. 945
(1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1695 (1952). But the diversity requirement itself can cause jurisdictional trouble-
for the plaintiff, although this has been somewhat alleviated by the recent case of Smith v. Sperling, 354
U.S. 91 (1957).
W agenberg v. Charleston Wood Products, Inc., X22 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. S.C. 1954).
See Schuckman v. Rubenstein, z64 F.2d 952 (6th Cir. 1947) (applying Ohio law); Southern Mills.
v. Armstrong, 223 N.C. 495, 27 S.E.2d 281 (X943). See I5 A.L.R.2d 1124 (1954) for other decisions.
pro and con.
"
5N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(k) (Supp. 1955).
"' Elster v. American Airlines, Inc., io6 A.2d 202 (Del. Ch. X954) (plaintiff was given an opportunity-
to bring in optional defendants, if he could serve them).
"°N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 5 5 -4 5(d) (Supp. 1955).
"A Ati. STAT. ANN. § 64-406 (Supp. 1957). This act purports to express the need for such a statute:
"Inasmuch as it appears that many small domestic corporations may be severely handicapped in their
operations by the inability of directors to attend meetings of the board because of illness or absence.
Ark. Acts 1955, No. 83.
372 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
not entirely without statutory precedent. 2 Unlike stockholders, who are by statute
everywhere permitted to vote by proxy, whatever be the common-law rule, orthodox
doctrine requires directors to participate in meetings in person 03 Even aside from
the fact that directors are a representative body, their number and geographical
dispersal do not create the same pressing need for proxy voting as do the number
and geographical dispersal of the shareholders.
3. Directors' control of compensation
Despite the prevalence of stock-option compensation and the many comments
that can be found in its favor as a method of attracting executive talent and spurring
it on to even greater managerial achievements, an undercurrent of hostility to the
practice, probably based on a suspicion of "too much of a good thing," occasionally
comes to the surface in judicial decisions. Particularly significant was a series of
Delaware decisions in 1952,64 which adopted as their method of assault the classical
"no-consideration" device for undermining contracts. These decisions led to a 1953
Delaware statutory amendment that "in the absence of fraud in the transaction, the
judgment of the directors as to the consideration for the issuance of such rights or
options and the sufficiency thereof shall be conclusive. '6 5 Similar legislation has since
been enacted in Montana, New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania. 0 It remains to
be seen, however, whether a court, while conceding the finality of the directors' good
faith judgment "as to consideration or its sufficiency," will still take it upon itself
to inquire into "the very existence of consideration" 6 7 -which may require a certain
judicial nimbleness. Incidentally, recent statutory provisions dealing specifically with
the granting of stock options .to management and employees show divergent views
as to the necessity of shareholders' vote-a divergency that perhaps, again, reflects
some apprehension of the possibility of abuses in this method of compensation. 8
Novel, less for dealing with directors' adverse interest0 9 than for singling out
self-voted compensation, are recent enactments in Wisconsin, Ohio, and Illinois which
05 See LA. REv. STAr. tit. 12, § 3 5F (95o), going back to 1928, but which requires an authorizing
charter clause.
"HENRY W. BALLENTINE, CORPORAsONS 131 (rev. ed. 1946).
"Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 69, go A.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Gottlieb
v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 82, 90 A.2d 66o (Sup. Ct. 1952). Ct. Kaufman v. Shoenbcrg,
33 Del. Ch. 2i, 9I A.2d 786 (Ch. 1952).
"DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (Supp. 1956).
"MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 15-1801 (x955); .Y. STocx LAW § 69; VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-17
(Supp. r956); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-612 (Supp. 1957).
"
7 See Framkel v. Donovan, 12o A.2d 311, 316 (Del. Ch. 1956). See also Elster v. American
Airlines, Inc., 128 A.2d 8oi, 807 (Del. Ch. 1957): ". . . the critical question remains that of whether
or not consideration for the options existed as of the time they were granted .. "
"s Compare MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT § 18A; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31-2-18 (1953); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-45 (Supp. 1955); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-17 (Supp. 1956); wth Omo REv. CODE
§ 170I.17 (Page Supp. 1956) (amended in 1955 to make it clear that shareholder's vote is not neces-
sary); PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-612 (Supp. 1957) (amended in 1957 to eliminate stockholder's
vote requirement).
" The California corporation statute of 1931 led the way in this area. See CAL. CoRP,. CODE § 820,
which has been little changed since 1931.
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eliminate adverse interest as a technical defect and, presumably, will force attention
to be focused on the really crucial matter-viz., the reasonableness of the compensa-
tion.70 The new North Carolina statute sets as a standard of reasonableness for self-
voted salaries "what would be paid for such services at arm's length under com-
petitive conditions."'71
A Wisconsin statutory provision is directed to a problem particularly contemporary
in view of fringe-benefit practices and inflation: Must new plans look only to the
future? What about present pensionees caught by inflation? The Wisconsin statute
authorizes directors to pay pensions and other benefits to directors, officers, and
employees and to their estates, families, dependents, or beneficiaries on account
of or for prior services rendered.72 To the extent that the power is used to readjust
pensions and similar payments to reflect changing price levels or to avoid arguments
of invalidity of newly-adopted pension plans based in part on prior service of existing
employees, the provision should find clear sailing ahead. One may speculate, how-
ever, as to the ingenuity that the Wisconsin courts will display should overreaching
arouse their hostility to the payments.
4. Directors' power to mortgage and sell
Particularly in view of statutes requiring a shareholders' vote for the sale of all
of a corporation's assets, there is always the danger that a court will announce that
a general mortgage of all of its assets, being a potential disposition in any event and
perhaps a present transfer under the "title" theory of mortgages, requires a share-
holders' vote.7" Yet, the giving of security is a normal incident of borrowing, which
traditionally is within the managerial sphere of directors. A few recent statutes,
therefore, have settled the matter by specifically giving the mortgaging power to
directors, free of any necessity for a shareholders' vote, unless the charter or the by-
laws adopted by the shareholders otherwise provide.74 Likewise, a number of recent
statutes, either by following the language of the Model Act-which, in turn, mirrors
the Illinois Corporation Act of i 93 3-in making a distinction between sales of all
assets in the regular course of business and those outside the regular course of
business, 75 or by different language with the same end in view, 6 permit the directors
to sell all corporate assets in certain designated situations where any good cause
to be served by a shareholders' vote requirement would be more than counter-
balanced by the trouble and risk involved.
"VIS. STAT. § 180.31 (1955) (aimed, no doubt, at Stoiber v. Miller Brewing Co., 257 Wis. 13,
42 N.W.d 144 (195o)); Omo REv. CoD ANN. § 170.6o (Page Supp. i956); ILL. REV. STAT. C. 32,
§ 157.33 (955), as amended, Ill. Laws 1957, S.B. 266.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-30 (Supp. 1955).
"WIS. STAT. § 180.31 (i955).
"
1 See Greene v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 24 F. Supp. 181 (D. Mass. 1938).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-X2 (Supp. 1955); Tax. Bus. CoRP. ACT art. 5.o9 (1956), as amended,
Tex. Laws X957, S.B. X29; VA. CODE ANN. § 13.I-77'(Supp. 1956).
" This would include nearly all of the recently-enacted corporation statutes. Cf. MODEL BUSINEss
CORP RATIoN AcT § 73.
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-112(b) (Supp. 1955).
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DIsnBUTONS TO SAREHOLDERS
i. Accounting concepts
Any remarks about dividends and other corporate distributions inevitably run
into accounting concepts, but since other articles in this symposium are specifically
devoted to these matters, there is no occasion at this point to more than reaffirm
that recent corporation statute revisions, taking their cue largely from the Model
Act,7 7 have broken some new ground in clarifying the significance and incidents of
earned surplus, revaluation surplus, other capital surplus, treasury shares, reserves,
and, occasionally, reorganization surplus and subsidiaries' stock dividends 8 Al-
though the new corporation statutes are constantly pushing into new accounting
areas, much of the pioneering along this line probably must be ascribed to the
Ohio statutory revision of the late i92O'SP9
2. Free-wheeling dividends
The significant novelties in corporate legislation are sometimes so concealed that
only the most painstaking analysis will reveal them. An outstanding example of
this is one phase of the dividend provisions ° of the Model Act and of the statutes of
the jurisdictions following that Act.
A quick reading of the Model Act would lead one to think: "I see that by section
forty cash dividends can, in general,8' be paid only out of earned surplus; well,
that's a sound, conservative position; true, I see something in the next section
about 'distributions in partial liquidation,' but that's another matter."
A second look at Model Act sections forty and forty-one would reveal that arrear-
ages on cumulative preferred stock can be paid out of unearned surplus, which,
too, is quite justifiable. But it would disclose that dividends, in general, can also
be paid out of unearned surplus--only, they must be called "distributions in partial
liquidation," and certain safeguards must be observed. Thus, dividends cannot be
paid if the corporation is insolvent or if this would put the preferred shares under
water, liquidation-wise; the recipients must be told that it is a distribution in partial
liquidation; and unless the charter dispenses with the requirement, the distribution
must be authorized by a two-thirds stockholders' vote. So far so good. Realistically,
it is a partial liquidation when dividends are paid to shareholders out of anything
but profits, current or accumulated. So far, nothing particularly revolutionary
is involved-and it is a definite improvement over the laws of most jurisdictions.
But a closer reading reveals the novelty-and the joker. "The board of directors
of a corporation may, from time to time, distribute to its shareholders in partial
7 See, e.g., WIs. STXr. §§ 180.02, 18o.38, 180.385, x8o.61 (1955).
71See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-49(k)(i) (Supp. 1955).
79112 Ohio Laws 25 (1927), as amended, x3 Ohio Laws 433 (1929).
"The basic provisions are MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATrON ACr §§ 40, 4x; relevant also arc id. §§ 5,
2, 63, 64.
" For the point under discussion, the "wasting asset" and other exceptions are immaterial.
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liquidation, out of stated capital or capital surplus of the corporation, a portion of
its assets, in cash or property.... 2  Combine that with an "appropriate" charter
clause, in reality written by management, dispensing with the necessity of a stock-
holders' vote to authorize the distribution, 3 and the result is this: If management
wants it this way, dividends can be paid out of capital, if they are labeled distribu-
tions in partial liquidation, even if the corporation is losing money, unless it is facing
creditor-insolvency or what may be called senior-shares-insolvency 8 4
In short, this permission of free-wheeling dividends does away with that venerable
cornerstone safeguard in corporate law: legal capital, however phrased-e.g., "stated
capital, .... capital stock," etc. This is the farthest north ever reached, anywhere in
the world, it would seem, in a legal system for business units of limited liability.
One may grant that the evolution of American law has been in that direction, con-
sidering both the frequently-permitted payments of dividends out of any surplus,
including surplus arising from reduction of legal capital and the generally prevailing
permission to reduce capital by mere stockholders' action, without veto rights of
creditors-unless the creditors contract for it-and without necessity of judicial sanc-
tion, as required in England. Still, at least lip-service has always been paid to the
capital concept as a cushion of sorts-reflecting, perhaps, some guilt feeling on the
part of the statutory draftsmen in the various jurisdictions who carved out the capital-
reduction loophole. This has been true even in those jurisdictions permitting
"nimble dividends"-dividends out of current earnings, despite impairment of
capital-since such disbursements are most likely made in periods of good health
and in at least some jurisdictions must be accompanied by additional safeguards8 5
The Model Act might well have addressed the matter more directly and have
stated as follows: "Subject to such restrictions as may be stated in the charter, divi-
dends can be paid irrespective of existence of profits or surplus or capital impairment,
unless the payment would make the corporation insolvent in the equity sense or
reduce its net assets below the liquidation priority of any class of shares senior to
the recipients, but shareholders must be so informed when receiving dividends from
sources other than earned surplus."
Recent statutory revisions in North Dakota, Oregon, and Wisconsin have fol-
82 MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT § 41. (Emphasis added.)
"'See id. § 4 1(b): "No such distribution shall be made unless the articles of incorporation so
provide or such distribution is authorized by the affirmative vote of the holders of at least two-thirds
of the outstanding shares of each class whether or not entitled to vote thereon by the provisions of in-
corporation of the corporation."
" Incidentally, diverse tests are adopted in the Model Act for creditor insolvency and for senior-shares-
insolvency. For the former, the test of insolvency is merely the equity test, or inability to pay debts as
they become due in the usual course of business. MODEL BUSINESS CORxORA-noN Acr § 2(n). For the
latter, the test is whether the company's net assets (assets over debts) would fall below the preferred
stock's priority in voluntary liquidation. Id. § 41(d). Since senior shares are not likely to "become
due," the equity test is not feasible with respect to them, and the balance-sheet test is the only alterna-
tive. But that is no reason for not employing the balance-sheet test as an additional safeguard for
creditors against free-wheeling dividends unrestricted by "capital" concepts. Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55 -5o(d)(2) (Supp. 1955); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 3 3 (d)(2) (rg5r).
"
5 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(c)(1)(2) (Supp. 1955); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18 § 132(a)(3) (195').
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lowed the Model Act in the free-wheeling pattern for dividend distribution, 0 but the
District of Columbia, Texas, and Virginia, generally close followers of the Model
Act in their revisions, have refused to leave this opening. Indeed, the new Texas
statute shows a commendable concern for the reduction-surplus loophole, specifying
that dividends from such a surplus, unlike dividends from any other lawful sources,
must be authorized by a two-thirds vote of all classes of shareholders, even by
ordinarily nonvoting classes0s7 This can afford additional protection to senior
shares, although per se it does not afford much creditor protection. But the new
statute then goes on to provide that if the corporation becomes insolvent, the directors
voting for such dividends, or for stock repurchases from this source, will be liable
to the corporation for the disbursements for the purpose of discharging "creditor
claims which existed at the time such payments were made or which were incurred
within thirty (30) days after notice of the reduction of stated capital had been filed,"
to the extent that such claims have not been fully paid after sharing in the corporate
assets.88
3. Barring old dividend claims
Even after time-consuming research, it will not often be easy in any particular
jurisdiction to determine whether the statute of limitations has run against declared
but unpaid dividends! 9 Does the statute start running when the dividend becomes
payable, or only upon demand and refusal? Is the answer to be reached by sheer
logical deduction from the rule (or fiction?) that declaration of the dividend creates
a debtor-creditor relation? Or is it a "trust" relation? Which statute applies-that
relating to trusts, implied contracts, obligations in writing for the payment of money,
or some other?90 A recent Wisconsin statutory provision attempts to cope with
the problem by cutting off the shareholder's rights to declared dividends and other
distributions if the amount declared as a dividend or authorized in some other
distribution remains unclaimed for six years from the date specified for paymenty1
This is to be done "upon declaration of forfeiture made by resolution of the board
of directors," provided that six months' notice be given prior to the effective date
of the forfeiture in substantially the same manner as prescribed for giving notice of
shareholders' meetings-i.e., mailed to shareholder at his address as it appears on the
corporate records. 2 A recent Ohio statutory provision is somewhat similar, but it
makes the lapse of time per se bar the claim, without the need of a forfeiture declara-
tion by the directors0 3 A different legislative solution has been reached in some
other jurisdictions by making dividends unclaimed after a prescribed period payable
"
0N.D. Laws 1957, c. 102, § 41; ORE. REv. STAT. § 55-221 (Supp. 1955); Wis. STAr. § 180.39
('955).
"TEx. Bus. CoRp. ACr art. 2.40-A(3) (956).
"I d., art. 2.4I-A(6).
s See Note, The Lost Shareholder, 62 HARv. L. REv. 295 (1948).
'0 See generally id.; xi FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 16, § 5370 (1932).
91 Wis. STAT. § 180.395 (1955).
21d. § 180.24.
O3 ino. REv. CODE ANN. § 170134 (Page Supp. 1956).
MiscEmANEous NovLTEs
to the state, there subject to either the claims of the owner if he shows up 4 -which
at least relieves the corporation of liability to shareholders, although it does not get
to keep the dividend--or escheatf 5
4. Strengthening or clarifying the insolvency limitation on dividends
In an effort to do something about the gradual decay of legal capital as at least
a modicum of protection for creditors, a phenomenon already mentioned, Oklahoma's
new statute forbids dividends "when, after payment of such dividend, the net assets
of the corporation shall not equal an amount in excess of one-fourth ( ) its debts
and liabilities." '  Although this is not entirely a new idea,97 so rare is an attempt
in that direction nowadays that the effort perhaps merits classification as a novelty.
Several jurisdictions have, for several decades, required that the corporation meet
both tests of insolvency-the so-called bankruptcy and equity tests-before paying
dividends0 s That still leaves some question as to the basis of valuation for the
bankruptcy test. One recent statute prescribes the test of "fair present value" of
the assets,99 apparently in the belief that at least this much protection for creditors
is justified, even though this may impose a conservative dividend policy on the
directors of a debt-loaded corporation.
5. Charter clauses cutting down preferred stock's dividend sources
One recent North Carolina dividend novelty is to forbid charter clauses that cut
down the sources of dividends otherwise lawfully available for preferred stock 00
Its purpose is to prevent the coercion of the preferred shareholders into a dis-
advantageous recapitalization bargain by persuading them that the payment of
dividends to them is legally impossible, despite current earnings, unless they concur
in a plan which embodies a capital reduction wiping out the capital impairment
that under the charter provisions is preventing the payment of dividends.' 0 ' It is
always a hard policy choice legislatively to restrict freedom of contract, but it must
be recognized that the charter, especially in publicly-held corporations, 02 is hardly a
bargained contract.
6. Protection of noncumulative dividends
Another recent North Carolina novelty is the attempt to protect that "waif of the
stock exchanges," noncumulative preferred stock, against dividend shenanigans by
"E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. S 116-22 (1952).
'5E.g., MICH. ComtP. LAws H5 567.15, 567.22 (1948).
"OF.LA. STAT. tit. 8, 5 X33(3) (1951).
"See CAL. CoRp. CODE § 1908, which is aimed at the dissipation of capital by disbursements fol-
lowing its reduction. See also the required assets-liabilities ratio in the North Carolina corporation
statute before July x, 1957. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-116 (1950).
"E.g., CAL. Cov,. CoDE 5 i5o1; ILL. RPV. STAT. § 157.41 (i955). These statutes go back to the
early 193o's.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(c) (Supp. 1955). "OId. S 55 -50(b).
"'See Barrett v. Denver Tramways Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del. 1943), af'd, 146 F.2d 701
(3 d Cir. X944).
'"For legislative recognition of the wider role of contract in close corporations, see N.C. GE. STAT.
§ 73(b) (Supp. 1955).
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recognizing in its favor a "dividend credit," as defined103 in the new statute. Briefly,
a "dividend credit" arises in favor of noncumulative preferred shares for those years
when less dividends were paid to those shares than could have been paid to them
out of earnings; and so long as such dividend credit exists, no dividend is to be
paid to junior shares.104 In a sense, then, even noncumulative preferred is made
cumulative-if-earned, charter provisions notwithstanding. Arguably, why be con-
cerned about noncumulative preferred stock? It is never issued-at least as far as
the writer has been able to ascertain--except in reorganizations, as a result of the
bargaining and evaluating that takes place in that process. If plain noncumulative
stock is what the interested parties have bargained for, why give them cumulative-if-
earned stock? The answer is that no one in his right mind consciously bargains
for directors'-whim-noncumulative stock-which is what out-and-out noncumulative
preferred stock boils down to, short of "fraud" (whatever that is), and if an enter-
prise is so shaky that on reorganization it cannot issue an honest preferred stock, let
it reorganize with plain common stock.
7. Compulsory dividends
Also novel is the new North Carolina statute's mildly-compulsory dividend pko-
vision,'0 5 although it has some claim of legitimate parentage in prior legislation
in that state and elsewhere. °0 In substance, it requires a corporation, on written
demand of twenty per cent of the stockholders, or of a class of stockholders in some
situations, to pay out one-third of its annual net profits in dividends. Its purpose
is to make it harder for the dominant majority in a close corporation successfully to
work the traditional squeeze play, wherein one of the squeezors' strategems is to pay
no dividends, despite good earnings, year after year, during which time the squeezors
are getting their returns through self-voted salaries, until finally the exhausted
squeezee sells out in desperation at a price satisfactory to the squeezors. The enact-
ment under discussion is quite complex and technical, probably creating as many new
problems as it solves and reflecting difficult policy choices. Obviously, the twenty-per
cent-shareholder requirement renders the statute virtually inapplicable to publicly-
held corporations, but the squeeze play is not much of a problem in those corpora-
tions.
8. Repurchase of shares
The "enabling" spirit of twentieth-century corporation statutes is Well illustrated
in the evolution of permission to a corporation to purchase its own shares. Its course
can be seen in the swing from prohibition of purchase under an ultra vires analysis-
in some jurisdictions at least, following the English precedent-to permissive pur-
'Id. § 55-(2)(5). °'Id. § 55-40(c).
... Id. § 55-50(c)-
"'
8 The former North Carolina corporation statute had provided that the directors must, by January
31 if no other date is fixed, declare a dividend of all the accumulated profits over and above what is
reserved for working capital. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-115 (i950). New Mexico has a similar dividend
provision. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-3-16 (1953). Both of these provisions were patterned after one
that appeared in New Jersey's famous corporation law of 1896, but which was subsequently eliminated.
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chase from surplus, and thence to purchase even out of capital in a few favored
situations where apparently there were deemed to be overriding considerations -of
corporate convenience. Ohio led the way in its corporation statutes revision of the
i92o's, permitting purchases regardless of surplus in order to redeem redeemable
shares, compromise claims, perform repurchase obligation to employees, resell to
employees, eliminate fractional shares, resell to others shares repurchased under con-
tract with shareholders, and buy out dissenters entitled to being bought out.'07
Recent legislative activity has added purchases under a contract with a shareholder to
buy his share at his death, 08 purchases by open-end investment companies (variously
phrased), 0 9 and purchases in partial liquidation of the corporation1 10 Increasingly,
then, the creditor's cushion afforded by legal "capital" is being discarded as a
mechanism for creditor protection."'
Some recent cross-currents against the stream of pure "enablingism" are, however,
discernible. In North Carolina and Wisconsin, the repurchase of shares is for-
bidden if it would reduce the corporation's net assets below the liquidation priority
of shares having preferential rights on liquidation over the class of shares pur-
chased; and although it is not entirely clear, in Wisconsin even junior preferred
shares may receive this protection on the purchase of senior preferred shares."
2
The District of Columbia's statutory revision," 3 in adopting a similar restriction on
the redemption or purchase of redeemable shares, reveals ancestry in this respect in
the California General Corporation Law of 193i, which shows that the basic idea
is not a recent one. Subject to certain enumerated exceptions, North Carolina and
Texas forbid the repurchase of junior shares when the corporation is in default in the
payment of dividends on its senior shares." The idea is sound; except for certain
transactions where there is an overriding policy, as in the enumerated favored excep-
tions-e.g., to pay dissenters, eliminate fractional shares, compromise claims, etc.-
a corporation has no business using its funds to make this type of return of corporate
assets to junior stockholders when there are arrearages on its preferred shares. North
Carolina carries the idea one step further: even redeemable preferred shares are not
to be purchased otherwise than by redemption-or for such favored corporate
purposes as have already been mentioned-if there are dividend arrearages on those
preferred shares, unless the shareholders of that class or the market are seasonably
informed of the corporation's intention to make such purchases." 5 The idea here
07 113 Ohio Laws 437 (1929).
108 UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-2-16 ('953).
IDTax. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 2.03-G (1956); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52(a)(5) (Supp. 955); VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-4 (Supp. 1956).
"I°N.H. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 294:28 (1955).
"" But see Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.35 (Page Supp. 1956), for a return to a capital-impair-
ment prohibition---except that the "stated capital" thus safeguarded is that which remains after the
reduction effectuated by the purchase, as to which see id. § 1701.31.
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52(e)(3) (Supp. 1955); Wls. STAT. § I80.385(i)(b) (r955).
... D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-904a (Supp. r956).
""N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52(C)(4) (Supp. 1955); Tax. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 203-C (z956).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52(f) (Supp. 1955).
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is to discourage a corporate practice that is not unknown: depressing the price of
the redeemable preferred stock by passing dividends and then buying up the stock
at less than its redemption price.
Besides the equity-sense insolvency limitation that is placed on the repurchase
of shares, even in the favored instances of permitted repurchase out of capital,
several jurisdictions have recently adopted the additional bankruptcy test of in-
solvency as a further safeguard. 10
A novel attempt to foreclose favoritism in the repurchase of a corporation's own
shares is seen in the North Carolina statutory provision that, except with respect
to transactions in the specially-favored categories of the kind already mentioned,
shares must be purchased only pro rata, or on an organized stock exchange, or upon
the approval of the holders of a majority of the shares exclusive of those held by the
selling shareholder, or in connection with regulated stabilizing operations0 7 A
Wisconsin statutory provision, too, represents a commendable effort to prescribe the
freezing of earned surplus applied to the repurchase of shares and then to state the
transactions which may thaw out the surplus so frozen.18
The recent statutory revisions have also shown a tendency to abandon some
restrictions, such as a required charter clause or a shareholders' vote, if shares are
to be repurchased out of other than earned surplus, but this is merely refining an
idea that emerged in the revisions of the 193o's.
One still, however, observes no statutory provision aimed at curbing that question-
able practice of the Great Depression: the corporation's purchase of its own shares
to bolster a falling market in those shares, sometimes in an effort to ball out the
management.
V
DIVERSE MArrERs ABOUT SHAREHOLDERS AND TmR HOLDINGS
i. Stock certificate recitals
The laws of a number of jurisdictions have, for some time, required stock
certificates to contain a statement of the rights of the different classes or series of
shares, if the shares are divided into classes or series. The increasing complexity in
the capital structure of many corporations has resulted in longer and longer state-
ments, particularly with respect to convertible preferred stock and sinking-fund
provisions. Since the size of stock certificates does not expand accordingly, being
set partly by tradition and partly by the rules of the stock exchanges for listed shares
-- eight inches by twelve inches is the New York Stock Exchange standard-the
result has been that the print is getting smaller and smaller. (Incidentally, what
with margins, stock-transfer legend, and reserved space, the actual space for text on
"1 MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, 5 28(c) (1951); X.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52(C)(2) (Supp. 1955); TEx.
Bus. Covax. Acr art. 2o3-F (1956). Each of these states employs the standard of "fair value" of the
assets in applying this test.
""'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52(c) (Supp. 1955).
"'Ws. STAT. S 18o.385(i)(c) (1955).
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the back of a stock certificate is not much over six inches by five inches.) Indeed,
the print is microscopic on occasions. The writer recently saw one certificate with
an estimated 17,ooo words of stock-provision text on the reverse side. Some state
statutes have, for some time, permitted a summary in lieu of the full text, but no
lawyer is happy with a summary. Recent legislation has met the problem by per-
mitting the stock certificate to state the designation of the various classes or series
of shares and then to state that the corporation will furnish the shareholder, without
charge, a full statement of the stock characteristics as set forth in the charter." 9
2. Stock certificates with old signatures or seals
In active stocks, large numbers of certificates bearing the signatures of the present
corporate officers will be delivered to the transfer agent, who may have a large
portion of them on hand even after those corporate officers have ceased to be such.
To avoid the expense of scrapping these certificates and the trouble of signing new
ones, nearly all recent substantial revisions of corporation statutes have provided that
certificates with old signatures can still be issued as if the officers had not ceased
to be such.' 20 A further Illinois refinement is aimed at avoiding a similar technical
snag where the corporate seal has been affixed to stock certificates prepared for
issuance, but has been changed before they are actually issued.'
21
3. Cash for fractional shares
An Ohio statutory provision has added to the choices available to a corporation
faced with issuing fractional shares: as an alternative to issuing scrip in lieu of
fractional shares, the corporation may pay off the fractional shares in cash.'
22
Illinois followed suit in I957.'m It remains to be seen whether someone will attempt
a minority freeze-out by a corporate recapitalization which, by decreasing the num-
ber of outstanding shares, reduces the minority freezee to ownership of less than one
share, particularly under the Ohio statute where apparently the board of directors
can fix the value of the fractional share.
4. Registered shareholders with fiduciary or incomplete capacity
The voting, transfer of shares and receipt of dividends by shareholders of record
who are minors or holders in a fiduciary relation has long been a source of worry
11 Fxa STAT. § 6o8.41 (955); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-57 (Supp. 1955); N.D. Laws 1957, c. 102,
§ 20; Osio REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.25 (Page Supp. 1956) (certificate may recite that a statement of the
express terms of the shares is on file at an office of the corporation within the state or with a transfer
agent); TEx. Bus. Coap. ACr art. 2-i9 (956), as amended, Tex. Laws 1957, C. 54 (mere reference to
provisions filed with the secretary of state suffices); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-20 (Supp. 1956); Wis. STAT.
§ x8o.i8 (1955). Mn. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 27(c) (1951) (summary of information included in a
registration statement permitted to become effective under the Federal Securities Act of 1933 is acceptable).
"' The recent statutory revisions in District of Columbia, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland (also former
law), North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio (also former law), Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, and
Wisconsin embody this feature. Delaware, too, has had such a statute for some time.
"' ILL. REV. STAT. C. 32, § 157.21 (1955), as amended, Ill. Laws i957, S.B. 266.
122 Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 1701.24 (Page Supp. 1956).
123ILL. REv. STAT. C. 32, § 157.22 (1955), as amended, Ill. Laws 1957, S.B. 266.
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to corporations, and scattered legislative recognition 24 of the problem antedates even
the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, section three of which relieves the corporation of the
duty to inquire into possible breaches of trust in the transfer of the shares by a
shareholder of record who is a fiduciary.'2" Amendment to the corporation statutes
of California and Ohio in 1931 already had extended protection to-the corporation
when stock transfer or voting was by a shareholder who was a minor; and the
Ohio statute went further by giving the corporation the benefit of a conclusive
presumption of full capacity of the registered shareholder, absent delivery to it of a
certified copy of a court order of guardianship of the shareholder!' 26
Recent legislative activity along these lines has developed some refinements. A
New York statutory provision authorizes a corporation to treat an infant share-
holder as entitled to receive dividends and other distributions, vote, give consent,
give proxies, make elections, and exercise rights relating to his stock, with no right
in the infant to disaffirm as against the corporation; but this protection to the corpo-
ration is mitigated by the qualification: unless the corporation has actual knowledge
of the infancy 1 2r The recent North Carolina statute makes knowledge of minority or
other incompetency or lack of authority of a representative irrelevant as far as the
corporation is concerned,'128 although presumably the saving graces of equity would
prevent the corporation from exploiting the incompetency to its unjust enrichment.
So, whatever rights a minor who repudiates the cashing of his dividend check may
have against other parties, the corporation is in the clear. A recent Ohio statutory
amendment goes beyond merely immunizing the corporation by specifically em-
powering a minor to vote his shares.'
29
Although the purpose of section three of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, which
dates from 1922, was to relieve corporations of the risks inherent in transferring shares
held by fiduciaries, the Act, since adopted in twenty-three states, has been aptly
termed a conspicuous failure!29a  In the 1940's and 5o's, Connecticut, Oklahoma,
and Virginia enacted statutory provisions to free corporations of the need to inquire
into the authority of fiduciaries in making transfers of stock (or other securities) ;129b
and the Uniform Commercial Code, recently adopted by Pennsylvania, Massachu-
setts, and Kentucky, would extend similar protection to corporations on security trans-
fers other than those made by fiduciaries, particularly the revised versions of the Code
enacted by Massachusetts and Kentucky." e Also patterned on the Uniform Com-
12'See MAss. GEN. Acms 1918, c. 68, § 3. 'D9B U.L.A. 17 (1957).
126 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2221; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 170I.28(D), 170X.46 (Page Supp. 1956).
127N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAw S i2-a. A 1953 'Wisconsin statutory provision is substantially along
these lines. Wis. STAT. H3 180.85, 180.851 (1955).
"18 N.C. GEN. STAT. S 55-59 (Supp. 1955).
129 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.46 (Page Supp. 1956).
12 94 Conard, A New Deal for Fiduciaries' Stock Transfers, 56 MIcH. L. REv. 843, 844 (1958). PrO-
fessor Conard's fine study shows the inadequacy of this legislation in achieving its purpose.
121bCONN. GE. STAT. § 29xid (Supp. 1955); OLA. STAT. tit. I8, § .ix8 (95i); Va. Acts 1948,
c. i62, repealed Va. Acts I956, C. 428, S I.
1"-8_PA. STAT. ANN. tit. IA, §§ 8-401-04 (954); MAss. ANN. LAws c. zo6, § 8.401-04 (Supp.
r958); Ky. Acts 1958, C. 77, PP. 377-80.
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mercial Code is a 1953 Wisconsin statutory provision."2 9d Moreover, three states
have recently adopted the Model Fiduciaries Securities Transfer Act,'ll a product
of the joint efforts of committees of the American Bar Association and the Illinois
State Bar Association, which purports to simplify transfers and minimize issuers'
liability in connection therewith. For a discussion of the differences, effectiveness,
and potentials of these various statutes, including the national and international
conflict-of-laws angles, the reader is referred to Professor Conard's excellent analy-
sis.' Finally, although not generally thought of as in the field of corporation law,
the "nominee statutes," permitting some kinds of trustees to put the entrusted
securities in the name of a nominee, which burst forth largely in the i94o's and 50's
would seem to achieve, despite their imperfections,:'2 some degree of simplification
of security transfers and some relief from breach-of-trust liabilities of corporate
issuers and their transfer agentsl
5. Notices to enemy shareholders
The period under consideration produced some war-inspired corporate legisla-
tion,' including scattered statutory provisions relating to communications and
notices to shareholders who are forbidden contacts, such as enemies or near-enemies.
One problem to which these provisions were directed arises from the conffict between
a statutory requirement of notice to shareholders and directors relating to meetings,
and the Federal Trading With the Enemy Act proscribing such notice 13 New
Jersey and New York in 1942 and Delaware in 1943, accordingly, enacted legislation
which provided that any notice otherwise required is dispensed with as to persons
with whom communication is forbidden by any federal law, rule, regulations, or
executive orderP'l Similar action has been taken, somewhat belatedly (one hopes)
in Ohio and North Carolina.' 3
VI
STocK TRA-NsERx REshIcTIoNs
The new Texas statute is the only legislation, recent or otherwise, that goes into
any detail in the matter of stock transfer restrictions.' 34 The real heart of the
matter, however-viz., which restrictions are and which are not reasonable-was
apparently believed to be too complicated for solution by detailed statutory rules.
'139"Ws. STAT. § I8O.85 (i955).
12-0 Conn. Pub. Acts 1957, No. 573; Del. Laws 1957, S.B. 287; ILL. REV. STAT. C. 32, §§ 439.50-57
'
2 Conard, supra note I29a. See also id., Simplification of Security Transfers by Fiduciaries, 94
TRusT & ESTATES 835 (I955).
11"Se Comment, 56 McH. I. REv. 963 (x958).
isgi Citations to the statutory provisions of the forty-two states having such legislation may be found
in the appendix to id. at 985-1003.
""0 See, e.g., supra 369 relating to wartime corporate powers.
11 40 STAT. 412 (1917), 50 App. U.S.C. § 3c (1952).
"'DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 230 (1953); N.J. Rav. STAT. § :1-2.5 (Supp. 1944); N.Y. GEN. CoRp.
Law § 32.
"
3 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 170143 (Page Supp. 1956); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-173 (Supp. 1955).
... TEx. Bus. Corp. Ac at. 2.22 (1956).
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Accordingly, the express statutory authorization is stated in terms of restrictions that
do not "unreasonably" restrain or prohibit transferability, or that "reasonably" de-
fine the rights of the corporation or of its shareholders to buy shares offered for
transfer, or that "reasonably" define rights and obligations under buy-and-sell agree-
ments binding on all shareholders of the class of shares in question, if the number of
record shareholders of that class does not exceed twenty. The restrictions can be
imposed in the bylaws as well as in the charter, thus clarifying at least one minor
problem that has bothered some courts, and restrictions so imposed by the corpora-
tions must be stated on the stock certificates. (Query, does that invalidate a side
agreement of the buy-sell variety, not stated in the certificates? Presumably not,
as between the parties thereto; these are not restrictions imposed by the corporation.
Anyhow, the statute in this respect differs little from section fifteen of the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act.Y')
VII
Proxrms AND OTmER MATrRs RELATNG TO VOTING
i. Proxies
One state has recently given legislative attention to the troublesome problem of
irrevocable proxies instead of leaving the matter to that somewhat complex area oi
agency law that is unfortunately associated with the "coupled with an interest" doc-
trine. A 1953 New York enactment provides that an irrevocable proxy, if it is so
labeled and if it expressly purports to be irrevocable, can be held by a pledgee, a
purchaser under an executory contract to buy shares, a creditor to whom the proxy
is given in consideration of credit extension, or a person who gets such a proxy as
part of the consideration of his contract to perform services for the corporation as an
officer.'3 6 (The irrevocability of proxies in that state is apparently limited to the
situations above specified,"3 which may be unduly restrictive.) A purchaser of shares
without actual notice of the irrevocable proxy thus authorized, however, takes free
of it, unless the irrevocability is plainly stated on the face of the stock certificate.
New York had already moved somewhat in the direction of legislative recognition
of irrevocability of proxies, although not too clearly, in its 1929 enactment that "every
proxy shall be revocable at the pleasure of the person executing it ... but the parties
to a valid pledge or to an executory contract of sale may agree in writing as to
which of them shall vote the stock until the contract of pledge or sale is fully
executed.""'8
The new North Carolina statute is unique in limitifig the irrevocability of proxies
to ten years, even if coupled with an interest' Its purpose was apparently to
harmonize the time limitation to that of voting trusts 4° and pooling agreements,14 '
18116 U.L.A. 20 (1922). 'so N.Y. Srocx Coau.. LAw 5 47-a.
"N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAW § ig. an'Ibid.
189 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-68 (Supp. 1955).
140 Id. § 55-72. "' Id. § 55-73(a).
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the voting-trust statute in that state recognizing no exception to the ten-year limita-
tion for the coupled-with-an-interest situation, unlike that of some other states.
Apparently it was believed that ten years is long enough to tie up voting rights,
especially in view of the fact that a party who needs a longer period may be in a
position, under a sufficiently foresighted contract, to exert pressure upon the proxy-
giver to execute additional irrevocable proxies from time to time as called for by
the contract, thus extending the ten-year period.
2. Voting trusts
A new wrinkle in voting trusts has appeared in the Florida statutory provision
that seems to abandon the theory that the voting trustees have legal tide to the
shares. It contemplates instead that the trustees "shall not acquire the legal tide to
the stock but shall be vested only with the legal right and tide to the voting power
which is incident to the ownership of the stock." '42 (A rather intriguing concept
of "title.") The certificates for the shares concerned are to be tendered to the secre-
tary of the corporation for him to note thereon the subjection of the shares to the
voting agreement, which fact is to be "recorded" by him in designated corporate
books, and this notation subjects purchasers of the shares to the voting trust. It
appears that the intention here may have been to dispense with the common practice
of registering the shares in the names of the voting trustees (the shareholder sur-
rendering his old certificate and the trustees possessing the new one) and of the issu-
ance by the latter of trustees' certificates; instead, the annotated stock certificates are
apparently to be left in the hands of the beneficial shareholders. If the result is a
"trustee" with neither legal title nor possession of the "res," this serves to remind us
that it is sometimes easier to attain a specific result from a court or legislature under
a reassuring false label than by sheer analytical honesty and plain talk. What this
Florida statutory provision seems to come down to is that if you agree to let some-
one else vote your shares for ten years or less, he can do so, regardless of your change
of heart. Compare the caution with which the New York statute approaches the
problem semantically as one of "irrevocable proxies," limiting the irrevocability to
designated situations.
A further novelty in voting trusts is found in the new North Carolina require-
ment that the real shareholders-the holders of the beneficial interests-are to retain
their voting rights in such fundamental matters as charter amendment, bylaw
amendment, capital reduction, merger, consolidation, sale of assets, and dissolu-
tion.143 The theory apparently is that the main business need for a voting trust is
to assure stability in management and that for this, little more is needed than to
give the voting trustees the power over choice of management.
New York requires voting trustees to keep records of certificate holders com-
parable to the corporation's stock books and subject to analogous rights of inspection
21 2 FLA. STAT. § 608.43 (1955). A later amendment eliminated an ambiguity in the new theory by
eliminating a reference in the statute to stock "held" by the trustees; the shares are now referred to as
the "stock as described in the agreement."
""
5N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-72(c) (Supp. 1955).
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by certificate holders1 44 The recent North Carolina statute has a similar require-
ment.
14 5
3. Self-voted shares
The Model Act puts into specific statutory language a sound principle that courts
probably recognize anyway146--viz., that shares in the parent corporation owned by
a subsidiary corporation are not to be voted or counted for quorum purposes, any
more than are treasury shares. 7  The recent statutory revisions in North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oregon, Texas, and Virginia follow the Model Act in this respect1 4s
The famous New Jersey statute of 1896, followed in this respect in a number of states,
had already forbidden the voting "directly or indirectly" of shares of its own stock
"belonging to" the corporation, language which lends itself to reaching the same
result.'49 Recent legislation in the District of Columbia and Wisconsin adopts this
older pattern.'50
Legislative concern with a corporation's voting of shares of its own stock held
in a fiduciary capacity is not new.' 1 But the Model Act's policy choice of not per-
mitting such shares to be voted is of recent vintage, at least in state law, 5 2 and repre-
sents a controversial choice, followed in some statutes subsequent to the Model
Act,'3 rejected in others' 8
4. Pooling agreements
Agreements for voting several blocs of shares of different shareholders as one unit
have led a checkered life,'58 but no statute seems to have specifically concerned itself
with the problem before the recent North Carolina statute356 This statute recognizes
the validity of such agreements, if limited to ten years-to synchronize with similar
limitations on the analogous voting trust-but does not contemplate that the stock-
holders' meeting is to be the forum for specific enforcement of the agreement.15 7
"' N.Y. STOcK CoRP'. LAw § 50.
"4 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-72(b) (Supp. 1955).
' See Italo Petroleum Corp. v. Producers Oil Corp., 2o Del. Ch. 283, x74 Atl. 276 (Ch. 1934).
" MODEL BuSINEsS CORPORATION AcT § 31.
"
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55 -67(b) (Supp. 1955); N.D. Laws z957, c. 102, § 30; ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 57.170 (Supp. 1955); TEx. Bus. CORP. AT art. 2.29(B) (1956); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-32 (Supp.
x956).
"" O'Connor v. International Silver Co., 6a N.J. Eq. 67, 59 Atl. 321 (Ch. 1904), abl'd, 68 N.J. Eq.
68o, 62 At. 409 (Ct. Err. & App. 19o5).
1"0D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-911(b) (Supp. 1956); Vis. STAT. § 180.25 (1955).
... See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. C. 32, § 157.29 (1955); PA. STAT. tit. 15, § 2852-508 (1936).
"" Cf. 48 STAT. x86 (1933), 12 U.S.C. § 6x (1952) (stock in national bank held by it as sole
trustee).
13 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55.67(b) (Supp. 1955); N.D. Laws 1957, C. 102, § 30; ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 57-170 (Supp. 1955); Tax. Bus. CORP. AT art. 2.29 (1956).
"' D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-911(b) (Supp. 1956); Wis. STAT. § 180.25 (x955). For an intermediate
position, see VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-32 (Supp. 1956).
' Cdmpare Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 6o, 53
A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1947), with Roberts v. Whitson, I88 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945), and
authorities therein cited.
... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(a) (Supp. X955).
... CI. Smith v. San Francisco & N. P. Ry. Co., 115 Cal. 584, 47 Pac. 582 (1897).
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VIII
FuNDAMENTAL CHANGES
Other articles in this symposium will generally discuss the current tendencies in
the area of fundamental corporate changes. This discussion, accordingly, is purely
supplemental.
i. Protecting the high-vote protection
With the virtual disappearance of "vested rights" and the almost limitless present-
day scope of charter amendment, a shareholder holds that bundle of rights that we
call his shares virtually at sufferance; votes of others may transform that bundle into
one utterly, perhaps shockingly, different. The parties to the charter contract may,
therefore, want to freeze the status quo in large measure by a clause to the effect
that amendments can be made only by a prescribed vote, higher than otherwise re-
quired. Perhaps such a clause cannot itself be changed by a mere majority or two-
thirds vote, if those are the statutory standards for charter amendments; 5 ' but to
clinch the matter, two recent statutes specify that such a clause cannot itself be
changed except by the same so-prescribed higher vote' 59 One of these statutes is
also fortified by a similar provision with respect to changes effected by merger or
consolidation, 6° just to forestall evasions by resort to the Havender subterfuge.' 6
2. Reorganization and federal statutes
During the 193o's, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and
Pennsylvania adopted statutes to synchronize state law with reorganizations under
the Federal Bankruptcy Act.0 2 The scheme of these statutes was, in general, that
pursuant to the provisions of a court-confirmed plan of reorganization, fundamental
changes in the corporate structure and securities could be made, without the vote
of shareholders and without dissenters' right of appraisal, by the registry of a pre-
scribed certificate executed by court-designated representatives, such as trustees,
corporate officials, and masters. The principal innovation introduced in later
decades was the extension of this technique to include reorganizations pursuant
to the Federal Public Utility Holding Company Act of x935 in California, Delaware,
Maine, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Virginia' 6 3 Wis-
consin contents itself with requiring the secretary of state and the register of deeds
to file and record duly certified court orders in proceedings under the Bankruptcy
IrB Sellers v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 23 Del. Ch. 13, 2 A.2d io8 (Ch. 1938).
1'5N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-1oo(b)(3) (Supp. 1955); VA. CoDE ANN. § 13.x-56 (Supp. 1956).
10o N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-1o8(b) (Supp. 1955).
"'Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 319, It A.2d 311 (Sup. Ct. 1940). By the
"Havender subterfuge," the writer is referring to what is probably the cleverest corporation law trick
of our times, whereby the law forbidding a given charter amendment can be avoided and/or evaded by
a fake merger. Cf. Langfelder v. Universal Laboratories, Inc., 163 F.2d 804 (3 d Cir. 1947).
"'DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 245 (953); ME. RE-v. STAT. ANN. C. 53, § 77 (i954); MI. ANN. CoDE
art. 23, § 71 (1951); N.J. REv. STAT. § 14:14-44 (1937); N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAw § 9-b; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 2852-320 (Supp. x956).
... The various Delaware amendments probably served as the source. See note following DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 245 0953).
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Act that affect charter amendments, without prescribing the effect of the pro-
cedure.0
The Oklahoma statute raises an entirely different problem when it authorizes
"compromise arrangements" between categories or classes of them, to become bind-
ing upon approval by prescribed percentages if sanctioned by the court.""' One
wonders whether a thus rearranged creditor might not still assert his old position
on the ground that the Bankruptcy Act's reorganization provisions have superseded
the state law.'6 8
3. Unfair fundamental changes in senior shares
The picture here is the recapitalization plan which wipes out the many years of
dividend arrearages on cumulative preferred stock, so that the wide gulf that prevents
the common stock from participating in the corporation's sudden prosperity is elim-
inated. As Messrs. Stevens and Larson have well put it:1017
That the common stockholders should enthusiastically embrace the resulting recapitaliza-
tion plans, with the elimination of accrued preferred dividends and usually the sacrifice
of other preferential rights by the preferred is easily understandable; what may puzzle the
reader of these cases is: why is there always to be found approval also by a majority of
the preferred, and, more often than not, a very large majority?
The answer seems to be that preferred stockholders . . . can usually be depended
upon to approve anything that is submitted in a persuasive proxy letter.
Understandably, management likes the prevalent law on the point: short of
"fraud," approval by a majority of the affected class makes any question about fairness
irrelevant. Not much has been done about this in recent legislation, less because
of a Candidian faith in this best of all possible rules than because of two factors:
(i) it is not easy to legislate on this problem without running into practical diffi-
culties; and (2) the constituency of most state corporation law revision commit-
tees is not inclined to advocate features disliked by management. An occasional
effort, direct or indirect, has, however, appeared in recent legislation.
A 1951 Nebraska statutory provision authorizes an adversely affected shareholder
to apply to a court to enjoin, on the grounds of "fraud or unfairness," a charter
amendment altering priorities of preferred shares. 1 8
Recent North Carolina legislation has moved more cautiously, recognizing the
difficulties facing a court passing on fairness, which often ultimately boils down to
a forecast of future earnings,"" particularly if under the plan, the preferred stock
"'WIs. STAT. § x8o.56 (1955).
.. IOKLA. STAT. tit. x8, § 170 (195).
" Compare International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (99), with Johnson v. Star, 287 U.S.
527 (1932).
J RO.BERT S. STWNS & ARTHUR LARSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 637
(2d ed. 1955).
"s NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-i62 (1954). (Emphasis added.)
... A recapitalization plan can, of course, be clearly unfair on its very face, as where, for example,
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receives some common stock or becomes "participating" or convertible. The new
North Carolina statute contains a provision forbidding clauses in the charter or else-
where that would render current earnings unavailable for dividends to preferred
shares. 170 This is accompanied by statutory authorization for payment of dividends
out of current earnings despite capital impairment and does away with a club
with which the common stock-through its spokesman, management-can bludgeon
the preferred shareholders into voting for a dubious planY7l
The North Carolina legislation has, at the same time, also made it possible
for the preferred shareholders to bargain at the charter stage for a contract changeable
only by a bargained high vote, which conceivably could be set so high as to make
changes virtually impossible.1 7 It makes a novel effort, too, to put a floor
under the dissenting preferred shareholders' payment-two-thirds of their liquidation
priority if the common shareholders pay nothing for retaining their position in the
recapitalized corporation.7's Furthermore, it extends appraisal rights to objecting
holders of preferred shares with arrearages when those arrearages are being adversely
affected by a "voluntary" exchange of securities pursuant to a transaction that in-
volves no charter amendment, merger, consolidation, or similar appraisal event. 74
4. Appraisal rights
The new Virginia statute has a meritorious provision that dissenting shareholders
with appraisal rights with respect to a fundamental change-under that statute, in
merger, consolidation, or sale of assets-who are unable to agree with the corporation
as to the value of their shares can be made parties, wherever residing, to a judicial
proceeding to determine what is due them, "as an action against their shares quasi
.in rem."'7 0 This may be preferable to such procedural alternatives as joinder of the
dissenters as parties plaintiff or defendant and consolidation of scattered suits.' 76
The whole question of dissenters' rights to appraisal and payment needs re-
examination. Too often our statutes have withheld such rights where probably
needed and have conferred them in situations where not needed-automatically, for
example, in mergers, regardless of whether the merger means for the dissenter a
substantially different enterprise. The pattern is haphazard. Often the existence of
such rights turns on the form of a transaction, rather than on its substance. Why
should a merger subject the expanding entity to appraisal rights by dissenters when a
whatever be the future earning prospects, it requires the preferred stock to make all of the sacrifice and
the common stock to make none, or virtually none, although such a plan was involved (and judicially
upheld!) in Donahue v. Heuser, 239 S.W.2d 238 (Ky. 195i).
170 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55 -5o(b) (Supp. 1955).
"" See sutpra 377.
1
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-oo(b)(3) (Supp. 1955).
..3 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-1I3(e) (Supp. 1955). Otherwise, there is the danger illustrated by Root
v. York Corp., 22 Del. Ch. 351, 50 A.2d 52 (Ch. 1946), in light of Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery
Corp., 136 F.2d 944 (3 d Cir. X943).
t11 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-102 (Supp. 1955).
1. VA. CoDE ANN. § 13.1-75, r3.1-78 (Supp. 1956).
"'See OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 170185 (Page Supp. 1956).
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similar expansion by acquisition of properties financed, say, by issuance of additional
shares does not? Accordingly, one must view as sound the idea expressed in the X953
New York statutory provision denying appraisal rights to shareholders of the sur-
viving corporation in a consolidation (merger) when that event does not make the
kind of fundamental changes in the dissenter's shares that would give him appraisal
rights under a charter amendment. 77 Further reconsideration might indicate that
appraisal rights should be made to turn less on the shareholder finding himself in a
different legal entity or in an expanded enterprise than on being drastically changed
with respect to participation in earnings, liquidation, and control. It might also in-
dicate that appraisal rights in a sale-of-assets situation should be granted in, and
only in, a sale of assets for securities of the purchaser corporation, as one recent
statute has provided, 178 rather than be denied in all sales, as is the case in most juris-
dictions, or be granted even in sales for cash, as appears to be the case in some others.
Sale of all of a corporation's assets for the purchaser's stock is, realistically, closer to a
real merger of enterprises than are some "mergers" between affiliated companies.
5. Required notice to shareholders of appraisal rights
The new North Carolina statute requires that when shareholders are asked to vote
on specified fundamental changes which give rise to dissenters' rights of appraisal-
certain charter amendments, mergers, consolidations, etc.--they must be notified of
these rights. 7 This idea is new in state corporation law, although it has been a
familiar feature of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and regulations thereunder 8
Amendments in 1957 to the Pennsylvania statute reflect the same policy.' 8 Wisely
or not, however, the North Carolina legislation expressly states that failure to in-
clude the notice does not invalidate the transaction in question, but gives the share-
holder, unless he voted for the transaction, a year within which to make demand
on the corporation for such damages as he may have suffered from his failure to
receive notice. It remains to be seen whether North Carolina corporations will omit
the notice and take their chances; the Pennsylvania lawyer, faced with statutory
silence on the effect of failure to give notice, would be less inclined so to advise.
6. Tie-in with SEC-supervised proxies
The new Virginia statute permits a merger or consolidation to be approved by a
majority of the shares of each class of shares, when the right to vote by classes
exists, instead of by the "more than two-thirds" vote normally required, if the
Securities and Exchange Commission "exercises jurisdiction over the proxy state-
ment" for the pertinent shareholders' meeting 8  The idea is a good one not only
because SEC supervision affords some assurance that the shareholders are being
""*N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAw § 87. ""hN.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-113 (Supp. 1955).
...ld. §§ 55-100, 55-xo8, 55-112, 55-118.
so 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9, schedule 14A, item 2 (1949).
181 PA. STAT. ANN. it. x5, §§ 2852-3i, 2852-902 (Supp. 1957).
... VA. CODE ANN. § 13.r-70 (Supp. 1956).
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adequately informed of the matter under consideration, but also because, in the
main, the publicly-held corporations within the federal proxy rules are the very
ones in which it is sometimes difficult to get a two-thirds vote from the scattered
and lethargic shareholders. For the latter reason, the Virginia statute might well
have relaxed its requirement that, despite the majority vote of each class, there be
approval of more than two-thirds of the total outstanding shares for a merger or con-
solidation. Incidentally, the thus permitted lower class vote for mergers and con-
solidations that fall within the SEC proxy regulations is not extended by the Vir-
ginia statute to charter amendments; however, it would be farfetched to see here a
further occasion for resort to the Havender subterfuge for using the merger device to
amend the charter.
7. Sale of assets
A relocation of a corporation's business is often accompanied by a change in the
corporate entity as, say, by the formation of a new corporation-perhaps in another
state-and the transfer of its assets to the new corporation for securities of the latter.
Such a transaction is within the literal language of those statutes that give appraisal
rights to dissenters on a sale of assets, but hardly within their spirit.' 3 Accordingly,
a 1957 Pennsylvania statutory provision quite logically exempts a sale of assets made
for the purpose of relocating the business from the necessity of either a share-
holders' vote or shareholders' appraisal rights.8 The same end, with resultant
out-of-state reincorporation, can be achieved by forming a subsidiary under the law
of the new state and merging the parent into the subsidiary, if there exists a favor-
able combination of merger statutes-i.e., the statutes of both states permitting merger
with a foreign corporation, plus a statute of the parent state dispensing with appraisal
rights in the case of a merger into a wholly-owned subsidiary. Of course, if the re-
location sale of assets is accompanied by other fundamental changes in rights of
shareholders, especially as between classes, the problem is not that simple.
The Model Act has given further impetus in recent state statutes to the now
venerable Ilinois legislation with respect to the necessity for a shareholders' vote on a
sale of all assets, differentiating between sales in and out of the ordinary course of
business-a distinction reflected also in recent New York amendments and, although
by a slightly different approach, in the new North Carolina statute. 85
8. Mergers with foreign corporations and with subsidiaries
Since the California corporation statute revision of 1931, authorization for a
domestic corporation to merge or consolidate with a foreign corporation enjoying
"'
3As a series of New York cases have recognized. See Matter of Hake, 285 App. Div. 316, 336
N.Y.S.2d 817 (4 th Dep't 5955); Petition of Avard, 144 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. x955); Rudel v.
Eberhard Faber Pencil Co., 2 Misc. 957, 146 N.Y.S.2d 498 (Sup. Ct. 955).
"' PA. STAr. ANx. tit. 15, § 2852-3Ir (Supp. 1955).
... N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAw § 20; N.C. Gasq. STATo § 55-112 (Supp. 1955). Cj. MoDE.L Bus'NEss
Co'ronxrn AcT §§ 72-74.
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similar authorization has become familiar. All recent statutory revisions have in-
corporated this feature188
The comparatively ancient vintage of the New York short form of merger of a
wholly-owned subsidiary into a parent corporation robs the revisions of the 195o's
in that direction of complete novelty. The outstanding characteristics of this latter
legislation are rather the simplification of procedures for such a merger-frequently,
all that is needed is a resolution of the board of directors of the parent corporation,
without a shareholders' vote 87-- and, perhaps even more important, the denial of
dissenting shareholders' appraisal rightsi s' Even the standard longer form of merger
under the Model Act and its followers, however, quite properly gives no appraisal
right to dissenting shareholders of the surviving corporation which itself had held all
the stock of the other constituent corporations, where the merger thus amounts to but
a simple absorption of the subsidiaries. s A new wrinkle in this parent-subsidiary
merger situation is introduced by section 68A of the Model Act's 1957 list of Revisions
and Optional Sections, which permits employment of the short form of merger
when the parent owns ninety-five per cent of the stock of the subsidiary, with ap-
praisal rights for the dissenting shareholders of the subsidiary,""0 but not for those of
the parent.
9. Dissolution and newly-discovered assets
One difficulty in corporation law long has been: What should be done with
newly-discovered assets after purportedly complete liquidation and after the filing
of the last papers that officially put an end to corporate existence? Statutes that
prolong corporate life for two or three years for purposes of suit afford no satisfactory
answer. The new North Carolina statute would recognize corporate life indefinitely,
whenever necessary to administer newly-discovered assets: the corporation can sue
in its name, acting through its last board of directors, however reduced in numbers,
or through its last officers; and the thus still-vital corporation can re-establish its
188 The list includes not only the states that have completely altered the basic patterns of their old
corporation statutes, but many other states as well: California, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois,
Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, and others.
..7 D.C. Cot ANN. § 29 -927h (Supp. 1956); MD. ANN. CooE art. 23, § 63 (1951); N.D. Laws t957,
c. 102, § 72; Oio ltv. CODE ANN. § 1701-84 (Page Supp. z956); VA. CoD ANN. § 13.1-76 (Supp.
x956); Wss. STAT. § 180.685 ('955).
""N.D. Laws 1957, c. 102, 5 75; Oio REv. CODE ANN. 5 1701-84 (Page Supp. x956); VA. Coon
ANN. 5 13.1-76 (Supp. 1956). Under D.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 29-927n, 29-927i (Supp. 1956), the same
result is apparently reached by requiring a dissenting stockholder to file his objection prior to or at the
time of the shareholders' meeting, and in the short form of merger, there is no meeting. And in Mary-
hand, the cash-to-dissenters statutory provision does not apply to shareholders of the surviving corporation
unless the merger changes their contract rights-which need not be the case where wholly-owned sub-
sidiaries are merged into the parent. MD. ANN. CooE art. 23, § 69 (1951).
... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-113(i) (Supp. x955); N.D. Laws, c. io2, § 75; Ot. Rtv. STAT. § 57.490(6)
(Supp. 1955); TEx. Bus. CoRP. Act art. 5 .12-F (1956); Vis. STAr. S X8o.69(6) (1955); cf. MoDEL
BusiNEss Co PoRArsoN Act 5 71. The District of Columbia's new corporation statute, although modeled
after the Model Act, omits this feature.
"' The new North Dakota Business Corporation Act of 1957 follows this Model Act pattern. N.D,
Laws 1957, c. 102, H5 72, 75.
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board and officers if it so desires.' 9 A 1957 Pennsylvania statutory provision looks
in the same direction.'92
io. Change in "entity" and abatement of ciminal proceedings
Statutes relating to merger, consolidation, and dissolution typically state that
pending actions or proceedings by or against the corporation do not abate by virtue
of the disappearance or death of the "entity" and that liabilities and obligations con-
tinue. Nevertheless, it is by no means clear whether a court will discover in the
statutes a legislative intention that criminal proceedings and liability fall within the
scope of this language. 93 If not, corporate death terminates criminal proceedings
and liability. At least one of the new statutory revisions, however, makes it clear
that criminal proceedings, as well as civil ones, are not terminated by dissolution or
disappearance in a merger' 94
ix. Restated multi-amendment charters
To work with a charter that has gone through, say, a dozen amendments is an
exasperating experience. Modern legislation has sought to meet the problem by
expressly authorizing a charter amendment to consolidate the original charter and all
prior amendments, plus any other contemporaneous amendments then also being
made, into a restated charter. Although one such statute antedates the I94O's,19
5
the late 194o's and 195o's is the period which has seen the most widespread adoption
of this legislation.'9 6 In some jurisdictions, the point is handled briefly by simply
including it in the list of expressly permitted charter amendments;9 7 but a 1957
Illinois refinement requires the restated charter to be reproduced in full in the notice
of meeting.'9 Many lawyers would probably advise such a notice in any event;
but one still may speculate as to what is the restated charter if the shareholders
believe that they are merely voting on the formality of consolidating the scattered
terms of their existing charter and yet the restated charter as reproduced in the
notice is different. Is the latter, then, only prima facie the restated charter? If so,
why not let the directors restate the charter, with prima facie effectiveness? North
Carolina so provides, with the alternative of a full-fledged amendment procedure, if
that is the course chosen.' 9
'lN.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-114 (Supp. 1955).
102 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-1111 (Supp. 1957).
I" Cf. United States v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 23o F.2d 646 (ioth Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 939 (1956); United States v. Line Material Co., 202 F.2d 929 (6th Cir. 1953); United States
v. Maryland State Licensed Beverage Ass'n, 138 F. Supp. 685 (D. Md. 1956).
""a N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-114 (Supp. 1955).
... Omo REv. Cone ANN. § 1701.72 (Page Supp. 1956). Apparently even prior thereto, one or two
states tacitly recognized restated charters by accepting them for filing and certification. P-H Corn,. Naws
(Jan. 28, 1952).
1.0 Thus, in this period: California, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
1'" E.g. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-56 (Supp. 1956); cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-105(e) (Supp. 1955).
"'ILL. REv. STAT. c. 32, § 157-52 (1955), as amended, 111. Laws 1957, S.B. 266.
... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-i05 (Supp. r955).
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A recent Texas technical refinement °0 makes it clear that the text of the restated
charter may include such changes as are then being additionally introduced, as dis-
tinguished from a mere consolidation text, and follows through with synchronizing
technical elaborations. It is the kind of blueprint the office lawyer likes to see when
he is working out a transaction, although one suspects that the bar manages satis-
factorily under something less elaborate2 1
In any case, authorization for a restated charter in the law of the state of in-
corporation does not necessarily do away with the customary requirements of sub-
mitting certified copies of the charter and all amendments (including this onel)
when the corporation seeks official permission to do business in another state.
Ix
FoREiGN CORPORATIONS
i. Doings classified as not doing business
A notable feature of the Model Act and of nearly all corporation statutes which
have undergone radical revision since 195o has been the inclusion of a formidable
list of acts that are expressly stated therein not to constitute "doing business" locally
by a foreign corporation.20 2 The basic idea is not new. For a long time, some juris-
dictions have expressly excluded purely interstate transactions, as to which there were,
perhaps, constitutional doubts. Others have long excluded the making of local
loans and the taking of local property as security or in payment of such loans,
203
or at least the taking of mortgages on local properties.204 Still other scattered ex-
clusions antedating the I94O's are local solicitations of orders through salesmen; 20 5
mail order transactions; 20 6 local installation of equipment by the outside seller
corporation; 2°7 holding directors' or shareholders' meetings locally; 208 ownership of
goods in local warehouses operated by residents or qualified corporations and local
deliveries of those goods pursuant to out-of-state contracts; 200 voting the stock held
by foreign corporations in local corporations and, in relation thereto, participation in
management and control.210 Sometimes, however, the exemption has still carried
with it one consequence of "doing business": it has subjected the foreign corpora-
tion to local suits arising out of the activity in question.211
New additions, largely stemming from the Model Act, include: maintaining and
defending suits and effecting settlements; maintaining bank accounts; maintaining
2 0 0TEx. Bus. Corn,. Aar art. 4.07 (1956).
201 Cf. VA. CODE ANN. SS 13.1-55(p), and 13.1-56(c) (Supp. X956).
202 See Legislative Note, 32 WASm. L. REv. 204 (957). Cf. MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATON ACT S 99.
20 E.g., Asuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-485 (1956); S.D. CODE 5 11.2102 (1939); NVzS. STAT. § x8o.8o
(1955). 1
20. KAN. GENs. STATr. ANN. § 17-507 ('949)-
"'2 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 343 (1953).20 ibid.
2071bid; Omo REv. STAT. ANN. S 1703.02 (Page Supp. 1956).
.0. N.Y. GEN. CoRp. LAw § 223 (in so far as concerns maintenance of suits based on such activities).
2
°
0TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-918 (1955).
2 10 TEx. REv. Ctv. STAT. art. 1533a (1948).
2"1 E.g., iVs. STAT. § I8o.8oI (1955).
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stock transfer offices or agencies; effecting sales through independent contractors;
and conducting isolated transactions 12 Texas has recently added the exercising
of powers of executors, administrators, or trustees with respect to a nonresident's
estate, if the activities do not otherwise constitute doing business; it also has added
investing, through out-of-state transactions, in Texas nonoperating mineral interests
and doing various acts incidental to such ownership?'3  An occasional follower of
the Model Act, too, goes beyond that Act in inducing foreign capital to invest
locally without incurring full "doing business" legal risks, sometimes with limita-
tions that have an eye on some measure of competitive protection of the local lending
industry'14
2. Expanded jurisdiction of local courts
Even before the International Shoe case,"' 5 the legislatures of Maryland and Ver-
mont apparently had concluded that local jurisdiction over a foreign corporation for
the purposes of suit was justified as a legitimate interest of the local state in the
protection of its residents, even though the corporation was not locally "doing
business" under the constitutional law decisions, and so could not be viewed as
being "present in the state" or as having "entered" the state and "consented" to suit
under its laws?'0 The subjection of a foreign corporation to a local suit arising out of
the local commission of a tort or the breach of a contract made or to be performec
locally, to the damage of a local resident, was not deemed by those legislatures to be so
arbitrary, capricious, oppressive, irrational, or whimsical as to violate the requirements
of "due process." As was to be expected after the International Shoe case, with its
apparent repudiation of the "doing business" test in favor of a "fairness and reason'"
test that would seem basic in any due process determination, courts upheld this legis-
lation 1  A novel 1955 North Carolina statutory provision went even further: It
apparently operated on the theory that if a company enjoys the benefits of a local
market for its product, one of the headaches that not unreasonably can be linked
to that benefit is subjection to local suits in favor of local residents damaged by
that product. Accordingly, it provided, in addition to the local tort and contract
features, comparable to those of the Maryland and Vermont statutes, that local
jurisdiction in favor of local interests could be asserted in an action against a
foreign corporation that grew out of the production, manufacture, or distribution
of goods by the foreign corporation with the expectation that the goods were to be
used in North Carolina, regardless of how or where produced or marketed?' 8 This,
212 E.g., Tex. Laws 1957, c. 54, § 4, amending TEx. Bus. CoRP. Acr art. 8.oi (1956).
213 Ibid.
2" See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5 5 -131(b) (6) (Supp. 1955); Tax. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 8.o1 (12) and (13)
(x956).
... International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
"'MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 88(d) (1951); VT. STAT. § 1562 (1947).
"' Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. i95o); Compania de Astral,.
S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 2o5 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp.,
116 Vt. 569, 8o A.2d 664 (1951).
... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38.1 (Supp. 1955) (this particular feature of the new corporation statute
was not postponed in effectiveness until July x, 1957, as was the rest of that statute).
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however, apparently went too far for the jurisdictional "due process" outlook of the
courts that have considered it, at least as applied to the cases before them."'
Another paragraph of this same enactment would base local jurisdiction on repeated
solicitations of local orders by mail or otherwise, and it remains to be seen whether
this, as well, is too much for the prevailing judicial notions of due process.
Another innovative feature of the recent North Carolina legislation in this area is
this: It would subject a foreign parent corporation to local suit through service of
process on its local subsidiary corporation, but only in those situations where the
parent itself is liable for the subsidiary's obligation.220 For example, the parent's
liability might arise from the thinness of the equity capital of the subsidiary or from
directing the subsidiary's patent infringements or other torts.22 ' Maintenance of local
suits against a foreign parent on causes of action so limited is not without judicial
precedent. 22 (This is not to be confused, however, with the broader and more dubi-
ous proposition that a foreign corporation is doing business locally if its subsidiary,
especially a wholly-owned subsidiary, operates locally2 3--although it is by no means
certain that a statute could not go even that far,224 at least as applied to causes of
action in favor of local residents growing out of local activities of the subsidiary.) If
a court were to follow a purely mechanistic separate-entity theory of corporations and
narrowly interpret the International Shoe case, it could, of course, pronounce this pro-
vision unconstitutional on the ground that it is the subsidiary, not the parent, which
219 Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502 ( 4 th Cir. 1956); Putman v. Triangle
Publications, Inc., 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957). See also Walker v. Ballantine & Sons, x49
F. Supp. 379 (M.D. N.C. X957). There is something to be said for the decision in the Erlanger case,
since the defendant manufacturer had done nothing to cultivate the North Carolina market; he simply
had sold in New York to a customer who came in to buy. The Triangle and Ballantine cases, however,
involved defendants who were systematically cultivating that market. The Triangle case becomes even
more questionable when viewed in the light of a recent Supreme Court decision. McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Note, 7 Du, L.J. 135, 139 n. 26 (x958).
The aftermath of this is interesting. Because of these adverse decisions, the General Statutes Com-
mission moved to delete the constitutionally-offensive section, and one of its members, who was at the
time serving in the legislature, introduced a bill to that end. The Judiciary Committee of the Senate,
however, which is largely composed of lawyers, opposed the bill on the ground that the provision, despite
judicial hostility thereto, was a good one and might still win favorable recognition in the courts,
(Reported orally to the writer by one of the members of the Committee.) Thus, the courts appear to be
at odds with (one may reasonably infer) the lawyers of North Carolina.
Judge Sobeloff, who wrote the opinion in the Erlanger case, rationalizes his position again in Juris-
diction of State Courts over Non-ResidentU in Our Federal System, 43 CORNLL L. Q. z96 (1957). For
what appears to this writer's perhaps biased vision a successful rebuttal, see Cardozo, The Reach of the
Legislature and the Grasp of Jurisdiction, id. at 2so.
.
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55- 3 8.1(b) (Supp. 1955)-
221 See, e.g., Certain-Teed Products Corp. v. Wallinger, 89 F.ad 427, 436 (4th Cir. 1937).
-
2 Industrial Research Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 29 F.2d 263 (N.D. Ohio x928). Cl. Mazzotti
v. Rainey, 31 Del. Ch. 447, 77 A.2d 67 (Ch. 195o), critically analyzed in Note, 6o YAuL, L.J. 9o8
( 9s).2
s See Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
... Id. at 336: "The claim that jurisdiction exists is not rested upon the provisions of any state
statute. ... Consider the implication of Berkman v. Ann Lewis Shops, 246 F.2d 44 (ad Cir. 1957),
for the validity of a statute that would clearly show an intention to view local business of a wholly-
owned subsidiary as amounting to "doing business" by the parent corporation, at least for purposes of
local suits on locally-arising causes of action.
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has the "contacts" within the state. But it would be somewhat paradoxical to
hold a foreign corporation not constitutionally amenable to local suit on its liability
for the obligations of its wholly-owned local subsidiary and yet hold it subject to local
jurisdiction through, say, the activities of a controlled "independent dealer" outlet 25
3. Internal affairs
A further North Carolina novelty is a statutory provision that actions against
foreign corporations are not to be dismissed simply because they involve "internal
affairs," but that dismissal must rather turn on considerations of forum non con-
veniens.2 20 Aside from the fact that this probably reflects the unarticulated basis of
most of the "internal affairs cases," one must not overlook the fact that foreign
corporations are frequently local in character.22 '
4. Choice of law
One may speculate as to the purpose behind the unique I952 Georgia enactment
that the law of the state of incorporation of a domesticated foreign corporation shall
govern the voting and other conditions of corporate action, the effectiveness of charter
amendments, and all rights between the corporation and its shareholders and among
the shareholders and the classes of shareholders.2 Offhand, it looks like a restate-
ment of some orthodox principles of the conflict of laws. Perhaps it was simply
meant to offset the other quite common statement that is found in the Georgia
corporation statutes that shareholders of domesticated foreign corporations are sub-
ject to the same obligations, duties, liabilities, and disabilities as shareholders in local
corporations.29
Speaking of the conflict of laws, one may also speculate as to the effect of the
recent Texas variations of the Model Act with respect to the officers and directors of
foreign corporations. Whereas the Model Act provides that nothing in the Act is to
be construed to permit the local state to regulate the "organization or the internal
affairs" of a foreign corporation authorized to transact business locally, 23 0 the Texas
counterpart refers to "the organization of such corporation, or its internal affairs not
intrastate in Texas";2 1' and a contemporaneous Texas variant subjects the officers
and directors of such a foreign corporation to the same "duties, restrictions, penalties,
and liabilities" as the officers and directors of Texas corporations. 3 2 Query: Can
these variants be construed to mean, for example, that if the directors of the foreign
corporations hold their meeting in Texas and have the corporation pay a dividend in
Texas that would be unlawful for a Texas corporation, they may be subject to
liability, regardless of the lawfulness of the dividend in the state of incorporation?
Or did this legislation have in mind primarily the pseudo-foreign corporation?
g' Kahn v. Maico Co., 2x6 F.2d 233 (4th Cir. 1954); Thomas v. Hudson Sales Corp., 204 Md. 450,
105 A.2d 225 (954); McNeil v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 109 S.C. 326, 96 S.E. 134 (1918). Cf.
S. B. MacMaster, Inc. v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 3 F.2d 469 (E.D. S.C. 1925).
220 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-133 (Supp. 1956). Cf. Note, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 666 (949).
117See Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137 (1955).
2" GA. CODE ANN. § 22-160i (Supp. 1955). ... GA. CODE § 22-I60i (1936).
"
0 MoDEL BusxNss CopoaXrIoN AcT § 99. g" TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 8.o, (7956).
I31 d. art. 8.02.
398 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
(Particularly in a pseudo-foreign corporation, otherwise completely Texan, can there
quite readily be "internal affairs" that are, nevertheless, "intrastate" in Texas?)
5. The local agent
A new twist with respect to service-of-process agents of foreign corporations
appears in the new Virginia statute, which requires such an agent to be either a mem-
ber of the Virginia bar or an officer or director of the foreign corporation 3 5 The
aim of this provision is not hard to discern, but it offers no stumbling block to those
organizations that make a business of serving as statutory local agents of foreign
corporations: all they need do is persuade the foreign corporation to make some
person in the organization's Richmond office an assistant secretary of the corpora-
tion-which, in fact, is actually the current practice2 34 A 1955 Kansas statutory pro.
vision with somewhat similar objectives requires the statutory local agent to be either
a local resident individual or a domestic corporation.F Again, the nationally-
operating service organizations have merely formed wholly-owned domestic sub-
sidiary corporations to act as statutory local agents.
6. Revocation of authority
Most statutes that specifically deal with the revocation for stated causes of a
foreign corporation's authority to do business in the state place the power in ad-
ministrative hands-usually the secretary of state. For reasons no doubt political in
nature, rumors of which have even been heard in partibus infidelium, the recent
Texas statute requires the revocation to be effected by the decree of a court. o
7. Charter-filing requirement
By a New York statutory amendment in 1954 and a Pennsylvania statutory
amendment in 1957, a foreign corporation need not file in those states a copy of
its charter as a prerequisite to permission to transact business there 37 This dis-
pensed-with formality, which has long been traditional in every other state2 8 and
which can be something of a nuisance for a corporation with an often-amended
charter, probably serves no useful practical purpose, despite theoretical arguments
to the contrary, and this break with the past is probably justified.
Aside from the features above noted and some minor details,2 0 there is little else
in the recent corporation statutes which, with respect to foreign corporations, is
unfamiliar, if for no other reason than that many of the new statutes are simply
lineal descendants, in this regard, of the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1933.
2
"
33 VA. CoDE ANN. § 13.1-1O9 (Supp. x956).
... Letters to the writer from New York headquarters of several such organizations.
... KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-4401 (Supp. 1955).
230 Tax. Bus. CORP. AcT art. 8.x6 (1956).
" N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 210; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-1004 (Supp. 1956).
statements of more vital significance than those usually required in other states.
2"3 Except New Hampshire, which has long been unique in imposing no such requirement, apparently
with no bad effects.
23 E.g., Tex. Laws 1957, c. 54, § 12, requiring in the application for withdrawal from the state
statements of more vital significance than those usually required in other states.
